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AAAA – Addis Ababa Action Plan 
BCF – Blockchain Charity Foundation 
BRICS – Brazil, Russia India, China, South Africa 
DAC – Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD) 
DFIs – Development Finance Institutions 
EU – European Union 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
LDCs – Least Developed Countries 
MF - Microfinance 
MFI – Microfinance Industry 
MICS – Middle Income Countries 
NGOs – Non-Governmental Organizations 
OECD – Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development 
ODA – Official Development Assistance 
SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals 
SSDC – South-South Development Cooperation 
UNCDP – United Nations Committee for Development Policy 
UNDP – United Nations Development Program 
UNHCR – United Nations High-Commissioner for Refugees 
UNOPS – United Nations Office for Project Services 
USAID – United States Agency for International Development 
WB – World Bank 
WFP – World Food Program 
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“As local as possible, as international as necessary” 
“Digital technologies, which are revolutionising financial markets can be a game-changer in 
meeting our shared objectives”. 




This work responds to the will to contribute to re-shape and improve the governance of 
financial development aid, both at the international and local level, in a context of on-going 
discussions about how to improve the efficacy and efficiency of the overall system. If we 
trace back our view and count the incredible amount of money that has been devoted to 
international development aid since the Cold War Period, and afterwards we try to evaluate 
the real impacts in terms of progress and development, we would probably be shocked to see 
that there is actually not even a closer relation. This means, that international development 
aid has suffered since its beginnings from a lack of efficacy and efficiency, that has been 
translated in low poverty reduction rates and slow development progress tendencies. 
Governments and international organizations like the UN have been conscious about the 
problem and have tried to respond by creating new conceptual frameworks and policies 
aimed at boosting the system. However, they have not induced important transformative 
changes for developing and least developed countries, yet in many of them under- 
development and other socioeconomic and political challenges have worsened due to 
multiple causes. 
The failure to deliver positive impacts in those countries has raised many concerns among 
the population – either in developing and developed countries - about the capacity and 
legitimacy of public institutions to continue controlling the decision-making process and the 
management of financial development aid. General dissatisfaction and distrust has increased 
over the last years, and this has brought many segments of society to rebel and search upon 
more democratic and inclusive forms of governance in which individuals can become 
empowered agents with capacity to contribute in achieving a better world. The situation has 
finally been more evident after the consequences of the 2008 global economic crisis and 
ultimately with the giant challenges derived from the pandemic of COVID-19. Paradoxically, 
funds directed to development aid have decreased whilst humanitarian and development 
needs have increased and intensified worldwide. 
In this scenario, it seems relevant to introduce new alternative ideas with enough disruptive 
potential to really contribute in making a change. A proposal that truly considers the 
challenges, the needs and the opportunities already existing and brings it up in a way that 
will benefit everyone, by leaving no one behind. This is precisely the aim of this work, and 
pretends to achieve it in two different ways. 
The first, by introducing the need for a change in the way international development aid has 
been conceptualized after World War II and more intensified after the Cold War. This means 
to shift from seeing development as a practice and alongside capitalism to fully support the 
paradigm of global development, which takes into consideration people-centered approaches 
and localization practices when configuring development policies. Moreover, in this new 
global development approach paradigm, the governance of development aid should be in the 
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form of multi-stakeholder global partnerships, as was effectively decided with the approval 
and functioning of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation in 2016, 
endorsed by 161 countries, multilateral institutions like the UNDP and the OECD, bilateral 
donor agencies, private sector companies, civil society organizations, and other relevant 
networks and stakeholders at the regional and local level. 
The second way introduces the new practical approach that accompanies the theoretical shift. 
Financial development aid consists in voluntary monetary flows given from one donor to a 
receiver with the aim of supporting and assisting in its economic, social and political 
development. It seeks to alleviate systematic challenges, such as poverty and the 
improvement of living standards, and thus it maintains a long-term vision. However, since 
the willingness is to overcome the main failures derived from the malpractices and 
mismanagements that mainly governments and central banks have made in this regard, the 
proposal necessary falls within the need to secure and streamline the delivery of financial 
development aid in such a way that it can contribute in meeting the UN SDGs. Hence, the 
proposal emerges after acknowledging the role private actors and civil society have and can 
play in the decision-making process and the implementation of policies due to their different 
capacities and sources of authority. Precisely, their expertise and social legitimacy are the 
main flaws lacking in international organizations such as the United Nations, and the 
elements they can bring to positively influence the route to sustainable development. Quasi 
intuitively, the practical proposal is, thus, the disruptive potential that the new technologies 
from the Fourth Industrial Revolution can mean in the financial development aid system. 
More concretely, how public Blockchain technologies can really contribute in improving the 
efficacy (securing) and efficiency (streamlining) of the ecosystem. 
The proposal fits in a context in which this field of knowledge and practice is emerging, 
finding only few researches and reports dealing with how Blockchain can improve 
development and humanitarian aid, and even less approaching its relation to microfinance. 
Moreover, most of them mainly adopt a theoretical perspective, focusing either in a concrete 
and technical aspect (see Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018) or choosing a broader one covering 
possible applications, benefits and challenges of Blockchain technology in the development 
field (see Zwitter, A., Boisse-Despiaux, M., 2018; Zambrano, R., 2017). The UN is the most 
important actor at the international level introducing literature about the functioning and the 
potential of Blockchain technologies, as well as practical examples of its impact in helping 
to meet the UN SDGs (see UNDP, 2018. White paper: The Future is Decentralised). 
However, many of those projects are being tested in specific local projects with the aim to 
progressively scale them to other places. This speaks about the real interest for including 
Blockchain technologies when adopting holistic and comprehensive political agendas, 
particularly in the development field. Consequently, the innovation this proposal brings is a 
critical reflection about how development aid should be thought and implemented in the near 
future, by passing from a broader theoretical perspective through a practical concrete 
mechanism – the Blockchain technologies - which can be applied in the financial 
development field. The work choses the weaknesses and limitations of the way financial 
development aid is delivered, and even more concretely micro-financial development aid, 
because it directly points to individuals in developing and less developed countries rather 
than to, often, corrupt states and commercialised banks. From this, the work proposes all the 
specific benefits that Blockchain technologies through the use of digital platforms can bring, 
again from a theoretical perspective accompanied by a review of selected different 
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applications coming both from the private and the public sector. The proposal is, thus, 
oriented towards the role the public sector can have when governing the digitalisation of 
financial development aid along with the expertise of the private sector. Because of this, the 
work balances a wide range of very recent electronic information coming from public and 
private sources. Nevertheless, since the private sector is the leading one in this precise field, 
it felt interesting to reinforce the work by carrying out an interview with someone working 
with Blockchain technologies applications, to see their view and their demands. (see Annex 
1: Interview with Miguel Caballero). 
In order to develop both proposals in a meaningful and comprehensive way, the work has 
been divided into three main parts. The first chapter introduces the conceptual framework 
that will be discussed and analyzed throughout the investigation, moving from the liberal 
approach to the postcolonial critique, and adding the multi-stakeholder partnerships as the 
future of public governance. 
The second chapter goes deeper into financial development aid, initially describing what is 
it and how it is configured in the international system. Afterwards, the work focuses on the 
evolution of microfinance as a complementary policy to development, assessing its real 
impact as an anti-poverty tool. Then it introduces the technological boom that began to 
emerge in the late 2000s and which have origin to the use of digital platforms to offer, among 
infinite other uses, better financial services to those in need. Through the example of peer- 
to-peer platforms, the work tries to exemplify a clear response that FinTech companies with 
the help of the civil society lead against the mistrust in traditional international and local 
economic and political institutions, for the way they had been operating in developing 
countries. A response that clearly went in the direction of incorporating more financial 
mechanisms to tackle increasing challenges, and which becomes even more important in the 
light of the pandemic of COVID-19. Those initial platforms have been the prelude of the 
ones that we can use nowadays, some of which are progressively incorporating the use of 
Blockchain technologies to tackle previous deficits. 
Finally, the third chapter addresses what is this technology and which relevant elements it 
offers for improving financial development aid and contributing in meeting the UN SDGs. It 
then supports the affirmations with some current Blockchain microfinancing applications 
either coming from the private companies and aid agencies, which maintain the leading voice, 
and from the UN agencies, which are still in an experimental stage. Describing the state of 
the art allows the work to end up putting into the table the current limitations experimented 
worldwide or by developing countries in particular, which ultimately prevent the whole 
implementation of Blockchain technologies. Those limitations are then counter-balanced 
with concrete proposals to overcome them. They are basically four: the potential for 
increasing existing inequalities and power asymmetries and the investment in capacity 
development and building trust as a solution; the urgency for building adequate technical and 
environmental infrastructures in developing countries; the necessity to adopt new 
international and national harmonized regulatory mechanisms about transparency and 
privacy; and the opportunity for really introducing more inclusive and multi-stakeholder 
kinds of governance in the field of financial development aid. Finally, the work concludes 
reaffirming this ultimate aspect, highlighting that the whole disruptive potential of 
Blockchain technologies will only be achieved if the international community is able to 
include in a proactive and empowered way all the relevant actors in the field: public entities, 
private companies, academia, NGOs and the civil society. 
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1. Main theoretical conceptualizations about development aid 
 
In their book Doctrines of Development, Cowen and Shenton declared that ”development 
comes to be defined in a multiplicity of ways because there are a multiplicity of “developers” 
who are entrusted with the task of development.“1 Certainly, it seems there is a consensus 
amongst the scholars about the ambiguity, and often contestation, of development as a 
concept, due to the difficulty of covering and compressing all the different visions, actions 
and practices it entails.2 Yet, as Alan Thomas suggests, from a historical point of view this 
conceptual ambiguity has been confronted by usage and power, meaning that only some 
concrete actors in the development field have had sufficient capacity to impose their own 
interpretation.3 Precisely, the aim of this chapter is to offer a critical view on the main 
implications derived from how development aid has been thought and implemented 
throughout the 20st and 21st century. For this, it will introduce the main conceptual 
approximations towards development aid, and will identify persisting challenges and recent 
opportunities in the field. 
 
 
1.1 From the liberal practice to the postcolonial critique 
 
In a globalized capitalist world, the liberal development view has prevailed as the dominant 
in the international community, diminishing the relevance and popularity of other social 
change theories which argued against it and proposed different directions. Because of this, in 
many parts of the world the development action has focused basically on targeted practices, 
including foreign aid4 which from the donors’ point of view would help to prevent and 
ameliorate socio-economic problems in the Global South (poverty, health, education, 
humanitarian effects of internal wars, environmental degradation due to malpractices).5 Such 
a limited view has constrained or even impede the possibility of using the development aid 
in larger and strategic long-term projects aimed at rebuilding the economic and social 
structures of underdeveloped societies. Strengthened after the Cold War, these targeted 
liberal practices can be understood from the interventionism theory, which has become the 
mainstream scheme at the international decision-making level because it sees development 
alongside capitalism, as a practice that needs to be related to it rather than a transformative 
process.6 
The current state of the art as regards developmental aid is translated into two aspects: on 
one hand regarding the type and degree of intervention and on the other hand the actors with 
enough trusteeship to intervene, both materializing targets and techniques that better suited 
 
 
1 Cowen M., Shenton R. 1996. Doctrines of Development. London: Routledge, p. 4. 
2 Cornwall, A., “Buzzwords and Fuzzwords: Deconstructing Development Discourse”, Development in 
Practice, Vol. 17, 2007, no. 4, p. 471-484. 
3 Thomas, A., “Development as Practice in a Liberal Capitalist World”, Journal of Intrnational Development, 
Vol. 12, 2000, p. 774. 
4 Horner, R., “Towards a New Paradigm of Global Development? Beyond the Limits of International 
Development”, Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 44, 2020, no. 3, p. 418. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Thomas, A., op. cit., note 3, p. 775. 
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for the required goal.7 In fact, the non-market intervention or intentional development aid 
refers to the compendium of deliberate policies and actions that States, multilateral 
development agencies and private donors have directed mainly to poor areas of the world, in 
order to compensate them for negative consequences of unlimited economic growth. They 
constitute intentional constructive activity as one agent is trying to ensure the capacities’ 
development of the other,8 acting on behalf in a unilateral way. 
The legitimacy and capacity to undertake development actions has been traditionally 
exercised by States in a unilateral way, including colonial, imperialist and more recently soft- 
power actions towards other countries.9 A North-South divide could be clearly identified in 
these international development contexts,10 which gradually changed after World War II 
along the process of institutionalization and globalization of the international community. 
Since then, there is a massive proliferation of development agencies, some of which in the 
form of international organizations (e.g. the World Bank, the IMF and the UN development 
agencies), NGOs, and more recently large private corporations and philanthropic donors. All 
of them claim their entitlement to act in favor of development, but the truth is that there 
continues to be an important misalignment between the interests of development agents 
(donors) and the needs of the receiving populations. 
Indeed, as the OECD recognized in its October 2020 report,11 since 1990s DAC12 donors 
increasingly earmarked13 their financial contributions to the multilateral development system 
for purely bilateral purposes, this resulted in agencies diverting the focus away from core 
mandates towards more narrowly defined donor-specific priorities. This increases their 
vulnerability, and it creates potentially adverse effects in the effectivity and efficiency of the 
delivered aid. Related to this, another important issue is how development aid is highly prone 
to corruption when it is spent through national public procurement systems which are weakly 
governed and highly corrupted.14 In these situations, donors prefer to use earmarked or a 
project aid subject to tighter controls, even though this blurs donor and recipient ownership, 
and reduces accountability relationships.15 
All those facts were repeatedly raised in the High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness of 
Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011), after acknowledging that in many cases 
intentional development had proven to be like putting a sticking plaster on a gaping wound. 
On one side as the policies tended to lack aid coherence, meaning the positive and negative 
 
7 Thomas, A., op. cit., note 3, p. 776. 
8 Ibid, p. 774-776. 
9 The soft-power is a political approach in international relations for which a country achieves a goal by 
attracting another country to its culture, ideals or politics. For example, the United States in Latin America or 
South Korea’s development approach in Africa. (Kim, J., Garland, J., “Development cooperation and Post- 
Colonial Critique: An investigation into the South Korean Model”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 40, 2019, no. 
7, p.1256). 
10 Horner, R., op. cit., note 4, p. 415. 
11 Bosch, E., Fabregas, A., Fishcer F., 2020. Earmarked funding to multilateral organisations: how is it used 
and what constitutes good practice? [PDF] OECD, p. 2. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing- 
sustainable-development/development-finance-topics/Multilateral-development-finance-brief-2020.pdf [last 
accessed on 5 February 2021] 
12 International OECD forum of many of the largest traditional providers of aid. It currently has 30 members. 
13 Refers to the concept when donors put conditions on how to spend the aid sent to multilateral agencies. 
14 Dávid-Barret, E., Fazekas, M, Hellman, O. et al. “Controlling Corruption in Development Aid: New evidence 
from Contract-Level Data”, Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 55, 2020, p. 483. 
15 Ibid, p. 485. 
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impacts that actions could have over other areas. And, on the other side, because policies 
focused on alleviating problems were not resulting in sustainable progresses in developing 
countries, yet in some occasions contributed to increase their indebtedness and their overall 
political instability. For example, the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs)16 as the 
conditions imposed by the IMF and the World Bank to developing countries to obtain loans. 
As a way of overcoming these flaws, the High-Level Forums also put on the table different 
challenges and opportunities aimed at improving the mainstream international development 
scheme. The last one, held in Busan (South Korea) in 2011, embraced new and strong 
commitments about ownership, inclusive participation and capacity development. About 
ownership, it meant that developing countries had to be included and held as equal actors in 
the formulation and coordination of projects. Inclusive participation signifies recognizing the 
valuable participation of private donors, foundations and civil society of developing countries 
in shaping the best strategy to improve the situation on the ground, but also to pay more 
attention to South-South cooperation (SSDC) as new emerging development partners. 
Regarding capacity development, it was necessary acknowledging that aid effectiveness 
would only improve if the focus was put towards mid and long-term results.17 Some of these 
commitments were reaffirmed in the second High-Level Meeting of Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation, held in Nairobi in 2016. However, this meeting 
signified a step beyond the previous ones by replacing donor-recipient relationships of the 
past by new multi-stakeholder approaches that could embrace diversity and the 
complementary contributions of all development partners.18 The southern providers (with the 
BRICS as the leaders) have progressively gained power in the global development scene, and 
thus have pushed for a partial rejection of traditional development aid principles and practices 
in favor of horizontal and inclusive types of cooperation.19 
Though it would be naïve to believe South-South cooperation does not also imply 
relationships of domination (e.g. China’s development cooperation in Africa), what it is for 
sure is a step beyond the North-South divide. In fact, the SSDC along with the changing 
responses of traditional donors20 helps us understand the progressive transformation that the 
world has suffered in terms of development, and the need to integrate new conceptual 
frameworks and practical tools to better respond to it. It is clear that the globalized capitalism 
has brought more actors to the development field and a growing interconnectedness and 
changing inter-dependency patterns between countries. In this context, a great part of the 
academia and many international organizations, such as the World Bank,21 support the idea 
 
16 Share the World’s Resources, 2008. Aid, debt and development: an overview [online] Sharing.org. Available 
at: https://www.sharing.org/information-centre/articles/aid-debt-and-development-overview [last accessed on 
8 February 2021]. 
17 It is mainly referred to incentive systems and public sector reforms, like: supporting country leadership, multi- 
stakeholder empowerment to fulfil the mandate, access to knowledge, approaches integrated to local contexts, 
participatory policy, among others, rather than technical cooperation. (Pretorius, C., Dendura, J., Dehove, M., 
2011, Supporting Capacity Development in PFM- A Practitioners’ Guide, [PDF] OECD - DAC, p. 21. 
Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/48782679.pdf [last accessed on 1 April 2021]. 
18 Kim, J., Garland, J., op. cit. note 9, p.1247 
19 Ibid. 
20 Mawdsley, E., “The `southernisation´ of development?”, Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 59, 2018 no. 2, pp.1- 
3. 
21 In April 2016 announced the removal of the classification of “developed” and “developing” countries in the 
World Development Indicators, after having defended to change the development paradigm from the North 
teaching the South to simply invest in a stable and inclusive future (Horner, R., op. cit., note 4, p. 423). 
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of taking global development paradigm as a more appropriate wider focus, considering all 
countries as sites of development.22 Basically, it advocates a mutual learning and a 
collaborative action across countries, in the same direction as the UN SDGs do. 
If the international community progressively accepts global development as the new 
mainstream pattern, then it should consider that postcolonial projects will no longer fit in it. 
As Banuri pointed out, “if development means `what we can do for them´ then it is just a 
“license for imperial intervention.”23 It perpetuates a historical colonial relationship in which 
the giver assumes a certain amount of control over the resources or economy of the receiver 
(e.g in terms of trade, the need for aid or technological dependency) to achieve greater goals 
and benefits that may not be in the best interest of the receiver.24 However, even if this 
continues to be in place, the push towards a global development scheme can also be leveraged 
to become a push towards the materialization of many core ideas of alternative development 
theories. 
Up to here, I have argued that the contestation of the liberal approach to development would 
be the global development and the post-colonial critique. Consequently, the next step is to 
introduce the people-centred approach as the preferential analogous development theory 
contestation to development as practice. Nothing new if we take into consideration that this 
same proposition has already been expressed by the OECD in 2020,25 when stating that 
“many of the most important innovations for development come not from international 
system, but from those living and working in developing countries around the world.” In this 
sense, instead of targeting from the North, the main proposal of this alternative approach is 
what is known as localization: developing countries, and especially local people, should be 
empowered enough to become agents of their own development, by their individual means 
or through local organizations.26 Deriving from this premise, development is no longer seen 
from the agencies’ points of view, but rather from as different views as local people get to be 
involved in the process. It seeks major social transformations by looking at restoring or 
enhancing basic human capabilities and freedoms.27 And by this, it pursues the principles of 
justice, sustainability, and inclusiveness.28 
 
 
1.2 The multi-stakeholder global partnership (MSP) 
 
Along with the statements expressed above, the IV High-Level Forum on Aid-Effectiveness 
 
22 Horner, R., op. cit., note 4, p. 425. 
23 Banuri, T., “Modernisation and its discontents: a cultural perspective on the theories of development”, 
Marglin, F., Marglin, S. (eds), Dominating Knowledge: Development, Culture and Resistance, Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, 1990, p. 1-33. 
24 Kim, J., Garland, J., op. cit. note 9, p.1253. 
25 Ramalingam, B., Innovation for Development Impact: Lessons from the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee, [PDF] OECD Publishing, 2020, p.18. Available at: https://read.oecd- 
ilibrary.org/development/innovation-for-development-impact_a9be77b3-en#page59 [last accessed on 1 March 
2021] 
26 Thomas, A., op. cit., note 3, p. 783. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Korten, D., “Steps towards people-centred development: vision and strategies”, Heyzer, N., Riker, JV., 
Quizon, AB. (eds), Government-NGO Relations in Asia: Prospects and Challenges for People-centred 
Development, United Kingdom, Palgrave Macmillan, 1995, pp. 165-189. 
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(Busan, 2011) is especially remembered as in the context of the economic crisis countries 
stressed to the maximum the need to develop multi-stakeholder global partnerships (MSP) if 
they were to achieve the commitments and the goals being set for the upcoming future. 
Indeed, one year later they created the Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation,29 as a platform were all the actors could cooperatively contribute to deliver 
sustainable long-lasting results. The configuration of this platform was detailed in the 
subsequent II High-Level Meeting of Global Partnership for Effective Development 
Cooperation (Nairobi, 2016), after approving six inter-related strategic lines of action.30 
Firstly enhancing support to effective development cooperation at country level, meaning 
governments, local NGOs and agencies, private initiatives and civil society. Secondly, a 
biennial monitoring on the current development cooperation landscape, involving all the 
actors. Thirdly the sharing of knowledge and scale-up innovative development solutions. 
Fourthly enhance the private sector inclusion and their resources and experiences. Fifthly 
learning from different modalities of development, especially those advocated from the 
South-South cooperation. And last but not least, sixthly, strengthen transparency and 
accountability throughout the process and among all the actors. 
Moreover, the MSP reached a unanimous support after the approval of the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (hereinafter: UN SDGs) in 2015. On one side as the UN SDG 17 is 
exclusively dedicated to encouraging and promoting effective public and public-private and 
civil society partnerships and on the other side, because the overall achievement of the 2030 
Agenda requires all the different sectors and actors to work together in an integrated 
manner.31 
Certainly, the multi-stakeholder global partnership is meant to become the mainstream way 
of designing, managing and implementing innovative perspectives in development 
cooperation globally, as it most accurately reflects how power, resources, know-how and 
legitimacy are distributed in the 21st century society. Such multi-stakeholder partnerships, 
which are inclusive and holistic by nature, are thus necessary if sustainable development 
wants to be achieved.32 
In this sense, the 2012 Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation33 has been 
endorsed by 161 countries, multilateral institutions like the UNDP and the OECD, bilateral 
donor agencies, private sector companies, civil society organizations, and other relevant 




29 United Nations, n.d. Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) – United Nations 
Partnerships for SDGs platform. [online]. Available at: 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/partnership/?p=25321 [last accessed on 4 February 2021]. 
30 GPEDC, 2020. Nairobi Outcome Document | Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. 
[online]. Available at: https://www.effectivecooperation.org/content/nairobi-outcome-document [last accessed 
on 4 February 2021]. 
31 United Nations, n.d. Multi-stakeholder partnerships & voluntary commitments. [online]. Sustainable 
Development Knowledge Platform. Available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdinaction [last 
accessed on 6 February 2021]. 
32 Overseas Development Institute and Foundation for Development Cooperation, 2003. Multi-stakeholder 
partnerships Issue paper. [PDF]. Kuala Lumpur: Global knowledge Partnership, p. 2. Available at: 
https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/2117.pdf [last accessed on 6 February 2021]. 
33 United Nations, n.d. Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) – United Nations 
Partnerships for SDGs platform., op cit. 
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revealed 34 that multi-stakeholderism was the way to secure successful innovation in the 
development field, whether this collaboration was pursuing specific objectives or rather to 
strengthen in this sense the development ecosystem as a whole. Yet there is a great margin 
of innovation from the DAC members’ point of view, like the promotion of ownership and 
end user focus, the growing involvement of private sector, entrepreneurs and academia, or 
the role of technologies. And it is mostly working at the micro-level, for example with the 
range of efforts to introduce public blockchain technology or mobile technology for 
development. It is encountering bigger challenges for moving beyond a major larger scale 
because donors’ reticence over new approaches and the inclusion of non-mainstream 
development actors still persist. Ultimately, the current state of the art is “incremental 
innovations that maintain the status quo than transformative approaches that disrupt it.”35 
As a way to overcome such limitations, the UNDP in 200636 already pointed out that MSP 
“will only have the desired effect when all parties had the relevant capacities and the desired 
commitment to engage effectively”, suggesting by this a “strong leadership and motivation, 
a network of conducive formal and informal institution to which to rely upon”, and most 
importantly, “a balance in power relations between stakeholders.” In the same vein, in 2016 
the OECD37 already defined the engagement of the private sector in many sectors and 
modalities of development cooperation (capacity development, finance, technical assistance, 
knowledge sharing, renewable energy, health and education, etc) ranging from informal 
collaborations to more formalised agreements. Afterwards, with the inclusion and 
acceptation of the UN SDGs at the global level, in March 2019 the Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation approved the “Kampala Principles for Effective Private 
Sector Engagement through Development Cooperation”38. The five mutually reinforcing 
principles, which rely on accepted international standards, are set to guide in much more 
detail the private sector partnerships in development cooperation. 
Having exposed the major conceptual approximation to development aid and the limitations 
associated with it, it comes along to say that there is an urgent need to start shifting towards 
models that could effectively respond to the challenges and demands of the 21st century by 
being more economically redistributive, efficient, socially inclusive, profitable, and durable. 
Therefore, as has been pointed out, the present work suggests that the progressive 
transformation of the liberal international development field necessarily encompasses the 
adoption of global development as the conceptual scheme, the notion of people-centred as 
 
34 OECD, 2020. Innovation for Development Impact: Lessons from the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee. The Development Dimension [online] Paris: OECD Publishing, p.36. Available at: 
https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/innovation-for-development-impact_a9be77b3-en#page59 [last 
accessed on 6 February 2021]. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Isatou Nije, N., Yocarini, L., 2006. Multi-stakeholder engagement processes. A UNDP capacity development 
resource. [PDF] United Nations Development Programme, p. 4. Available at: http://content- 
ext.undp.org/aplaws_publications/1463193/Engagement-Processes-cp7.pdf [last accessed on 6 February 2021]. 
37 OECD, 2016. Peer learning: Lessons from DAC Members on Effectively Engaging the Private Sector in 
Development Co-operation. [PDF] The Development Assistance Committee: Enabling Effective Development. 
Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/peer-reviews/Highlights-from-a-Peer- 
Learning-Review.pdf [last accessed on 7 February 2021]. 
38 GPEDC, 2019. Kampala Principles for Effective Private Sector Engagement through Development 
Cooperation. [PDF]. Effective Cooperation. Available at: 
https://www.effectivecooperation.org/system/files/2019-07/Kampala%20Principles%20-%20final.pdf [last 
accessed on 7 February 2021]. 
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the approach, and the multi-stakeholder partnership as the strategy. Given their nature they 
get to reflect better the demands for more inclusive, democratic-horizontal and bottom-up 
governance; they allow an easier tracking of funds as they shorten the number of 
intermediaries and thus of committing corruption; and they assure major efficiency holistic 
outcomes by alienating the sending resources with the receiver preferences or necessities. A 
suggestion that was already pointed out in the “Report of the Intergovernmental Committee 
of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing”39 from 2014. 
 
 
2. Financial development aid 
 
2.1 What is financial development aid 
 
Financial development aid consists in voluntary monetary flows given from one donor to a 
receiver with the aim of supporting and assisting in its economic, social and political 
development. It seeks to alleviate systematic challenges, such as poverty and the 
improvement of living standards, and thus it maintains a long-term vision. At the 
international level, the development finance system is compounded by progressively more 
diversified actors, which provide a multiplicity of financing options oriented towards the 
further development of developing countries.40 
Nowadays, the main source of financing for development aid in LDCs is still the Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), which in 2014 accounted for nearly the 70% of the total 
amount of global financial development aid (see Table 1). It is sent by OECD DAC members 
to other countries figuring in their list of ODA recipients41 (bilateral aid), or to international 
development institutions (multilateral aid) through which aid is channeled, like the UN 
programs, the World Bank and the IMF. The financial aid is then provided by the official 
agencies of the receiving country and it has a concessional nature. The aid is therefore grants 
or loans adjudicated with the objective to promote progress and economic development, and 
they can focus on small local projects or on very huge policies at the national level.42 Grants 
are financial resources provided to developing countries free of interests and with no 
provision of repayment. And soft loans are financial resources which have to be repaid but 
with a variable lower interest rate than if borrowed to commercial banks.43 Moreover, ODA 
 
39 United Nations, 2014. Report of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development 
Financing. [PDF] United Nations, pp. 14-16. Available at: https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp- 
content/uploads/2014/12/ICESDF.pdf [last accessed on 8 February 2021]. 
40 Ibid, p. vii-xii; United Nations, 2015. Addis Ababa Action Agenda. [PDF]. New York: United Nations, p. 2. 
Available at: https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf [last accessed on 
29 February 2021] 
41 OECD, n.d. DAC list of ODA Recipients – OECD [online]. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/development/financingsustainabledevelopment/developmentfinancestandards/daclist.ht 
m [last accessed on 9 February 2021]. 
42 Agence Française de Développement, n.d. Development aid: What’s it all about? [online] Available at: 
https://www.afd.fr/en/development-aid-whats-it-all-about [last accessed on 8 February 2021]. 
43 OECD, 2021. Official Development Assistance. What is ODA? [PDF] Paris: OECD Publishing, p.4. Available 
at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/What-is- 
ODA.pdf [last accessed on 14 April 2021] 
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can also combine private sector instruments, like capital contributions to Development 
Finance Institutions (DFIs), individual non-concessional loans44 and “individual equity 
investments to private sector companies in developing countries”.45 
Particularly, ODA plays a central role in the financing of social services in LDCs - over two 
thirds of their total external finance46 since they do not have enough capacity for increasing 
the mobilization of domestic resources through national savings or tax collection in favor of 
development purposes. Indeed, ODA enables the creation of a more prosperous environment 
by creating the dynamics needed for private businesses to flourish.47 This is why DAC 
members are pushing ODA to be better used as a lever to generate private investment and 
domestic tax revenue in poor countries to help achieve the UN SDGs.48 
 
 






44 Differentiated from concessional loans because the former are provided at, or near to, market terms. (OECD, 
2015. Development Co-operation Report 2015: Making Partnerships Effective Coalition for Action. [PDF] 
Paris: OECD Publishing. Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/development-co-operation- 
report-2015/glossary_dcr-2015-60-en;jsessionid=-5okYGij7fOqizPkzgggVpYX.ip-10-240-5-186 [last 
accessed on 22 February 2021]). 
45 OECD, 2021., op. cit, note 44, p. 5 
46 UNCDP, 2015. The role of ODA in the new financing for development landscape. [Pdf]. UNCDP, pp. 1-3. 
Available at: https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/CDP-excerpt-2015- 
2.pdf [last accessed on 22 February 2021] 
47 Agence Française de Développement, op. cit, note 43. 
48 OECD, 2019. Development aid drops in 2018, especially to neediest countries – OECD. [online]. Available 
at: https://www.oecd.org/development/development-aid-drops-in-2018-especially-to-neediest-countries.htm 
[last accessed on 22 February 2021] 
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Source: OECD DAC statistics and World Bank data on remittances49 
*ODA is compounded by Concessional DAC and Non-concessional DAC 
 
 
However, since 2013 the ODA bilateral and multilateral flows suffer from a decreasing 
tendency that has been fluctuating over the years. In addition, they have been vastly criticized 
because of the consequences that earmarked conditions have in the loss of aid effectiveness,50 
meaning that donors repeatedly mismatch the countries’ needs with the allocated aid because 
of political or economic interests they might have. In consequence, only a few countries have 
graduated from the LDC status, while the remaining 48 have ended up in a condemned 
situation of aid-dependency and over-indebtedness, with high extreme poverty rates and low 
economic and social opportunities.51 Finally, UNCDP52 also highlighted the negative effects 
of aid dependency to LDCs, for example on institutions and governance, which previous 
scholars also found.53 Concretely, that “the more ODA-dependence a state has, the worse 
their democratic and bureaucratic performance and corruption levels become”, because the 
conflict on aid funds increases, and they feel less accountable for their actions54. 
In this respect, in the Addis Ababa Action Plan55 (AAAA) of 2015, recalling on the 
Monterrey Consensus56 (2002) and the Doha Declaration57 (2008), countries committed 
themselves to reverse this decline, by allocating the 0,7% of GNI to developing countries and 
between 0,15-0,20% of GNI to LDCs. But the truth is that, even though in 2019 ODA 




49 OECD, 2016. Taking stock of aid to least developed countries (LDCs). [PDF] Paris: OECD Publishing, pp. 
1-2. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/Taking-stock-of-aid-to-least- 
developed-countries.pdf [last accessed on 28 February 2021] 
50 UNCDP 2015., op. cit, note 47. 
51 OECD 2016., op. cit, note 50. 
52 UNCDP., op. cit, note 47. 
53 Knack, S., “Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country Empirical Tests.”, Southern 
Economic Journal, Vol. 68, 2001, no. 2, pp. 310-329; Knack, S., “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?”, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 48, 2004, no. 1, pp. 251-266; Knack, S., Rahman, A., “Donor 
fragmentation and Bureaucratic Quality in Aid Recipients”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 83, 2007, 
no. 1, pp.189-192. 
54 Charron, N., “Exploring the impact of foreign aid on corruption: has the “anti-corruption movement” been 
effective?”, The Developing Economies, Vol. 49, 2011, no. 1, pp. 66-70. 
55 United Nations, 2015, op. cit. note 41, p. 26. 
56 Celebrated in Mexico in the framework of the International Conference on Financing for Development, it put 
an emphasis in the use of the public and private financing, and the adoption of a multi-stakeholder approach 
which included private companies, the civil society and other relevant stakeholders. (United Nations, 2003. 
Monterrey Consensus of the International Conference on Financing for Development. [PDF]. Monterrey: 
United Nations, pp. 9-10-22. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/pdfs/MonterreyConsensus.pdf [last accessed on 28 February 2021]). 
57 Celebrated in Qatar in the framework of the Follow-up International Conference on Financing for 
Development, it reaffirmed the goals and commitments decided in the Monterrey Consensus, and updated on 
new emerging challenges. (United Nations, 2009. Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: Outcome 
Document of the Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to Review the 
Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus. [PDF]. Doha: United Nations, pp. 5-29. Available at: 
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represents 0,30% of the combined DAC’s GNI.58 In the AAAA, countries further stressed 
the need to increase transparency and monitoring throughout the international development 
finance system. And by 2016 the OECD released a new international guidance on fighting 
corruption in ODA financed projects, acknowledging that “development activities were very 
often accompanied by different forms of corruption, which caused the loss of billions of euros 
being channeled to private pockets instead of countries in need.”59 
The perpetuation of this situation is especially alarming if considering that to meet the UN 
SDGs in 2030 the world should annually increase additionally around $2.4 trillion in 
development investment.60 And ultimately, culminating with the fact that the COVID-19 has 
created long-lasting repercussions on developing countries, worsening their financial needs 
to which DAC donors are expected to respond with more resources.61 
In this context, the 2020 Financing for Sustainable Development Report62 points out the need 
to put more efforts in increasing and improving access to ODA. But also, like the UN SDGs, 
it claims to mobilize additional financial resources coming from South-South cooperation, 
Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), 
and other actors from the private sector (NGOs, philanthropists, private social investments) 
which are becoming more and more important in the international financial development 
system. The mobilization comes along with a call to improve the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of development cooperation, by considering the countries’ background, 
priorities and needs, and matching donors’ resources to it. 
 
 
2.2 The international development finance system 
 
In the 21st century the international development financial system has become more complex 
because more and new actors have proliferated (see Table 2) beyond ODA flows.63 With a 
public and private nature, they have contributed to increase the range of available financial 
instruments, and as such, the global contributions to development aid, as demanded the UN 
SDGs. Nevertheless, all of them have different development paradigms and interests, which 
has led to the lack of aid coherence and has favoured less overall accountability. As a way of 
simplifying the system, the critical actors participating in it range from a public nature, 
 
 
58 OECD, 2020. Aid by DAC members increases in 2019 with more aid to the poorest countries. [PDF]. Paris: 
OECD, p. 1. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance- 
data/ODA-2019-detailed-summary.pdf [last accessed on 28 February 2021] 
59 OECD, 2016. New OECD guidance aims to reduce corruption in aid sector. [online]. Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/corruption/new-oecd-guidance-aims-to-reduce-corruption-in-aid-sector.htm [last 
accessed on 28 February 2021] 
60 Ingram, G., Mosbacher Jr, R., 2018. Development finance: Filling today’s funding gap. [online]. 
Brookings.edu. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/research/development-finance-filling-todaysfunding- 
gap/ [last accessed on 28 February 2021]. 
61 OECD 2020, op cit, note 59, p. 1. 
62 United Nations Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development, 2021. Financing for Sustainable 
Development Report 2020. [online]. New York: United Nations, p. 82. Available at: 
https://developmentfinance.un.org/sites/developmentfinance.un.org/files/FSDR_2020.pdf [last accessed on 28 
February 2021] 
63 Knack, S., Smets, L., “Aid tying and Donor Fragmentation”, World Development, Vol. 44, 2013, p. 64 
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mainly the States and the multilateral international organizations, to a private one, with the 
growing resources delivered by private philanthropists and the private commercial sector. 
 
2.2.1 The role of the States 
 
States maintain a predominant role in financing for development aid, with a great imbalance 
in favor of bilateral channels rather than multilateral options. They are the ones in charge of 
setting international standards and priorities for the other actors to follow, but they cannot be 
analyzed as a homogeneous group with similar preferences, but rather a very diverse one 
compounded by the traditional donors and the emerging donors. 
Traditional donors represent the 30 DAC members which deliver ODA flows to developing 
countries and remain the single largest source of external development finance in LDCs and 
MICs.64 With a reminiscence of the North-South divide mentality, they manage to maintain 
the monopoly of international financial development cooperation. As for 2019, their main 
contributor was the United States65 (in absolute terms). However, in the last decade emerging 
donors have entered with force into the arena, framing the new “South-South” alternative 
cooperation scheme, in which the objective of development is linked to obtaining explicit 
commercial goals. They are expanding in scope, volume and geographical reach, with China 
being the country with the biggest growing share.66 
 
 
2.2.2 The role of multilateral international organizations 
 
Multilateral international organizations can take a variety of forms, but they all have in 
common two aspects. Firstly, they mainly rely on country contributions, and for such they 
are always facing budgets’ vulnerabilities. And secondly, that they can centralize, distribute 
and better align the different resources with the country needs. However, due to the 
proliferation of new multilateral entities, the organizations have become more fragmented 
and opaquer, facing problems of transparency and overlapping mandates, which ultimately 
once again affect the effectiveness of the aid being delivered and the credibility and 
legitimacy toward the society.67 
In 2010, data revealed68 that over 200 organizations, funds and trust-funds work in 
multilateral cooperation, but the aid is basically monopolized by 5 main actors representing 
the 81% of resources being spent. If we exclude the DAC members, then we have the UN 
funds and programs, that represent approximately a total 10% of the overall international 
cooperation. Especially important are the UNDP and the UNCDF, which receive public and 
 
 
64 Prizzon, A., Greenhill, R, Mustapha, S., 2016. An Age of choice for development finance: Evidence from 
country case studies. [online]. London: ODI, pp. 3-4. Available at: 
https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/10652.pdf [last accessed on 28 February 2021] 
65 OECD, n.d., op cit., note 42. 
66 UNCTAD, 2020. Robust and predictable sources of financing for sustainable development. [online]. 
Available at: https://sdgpulse.unctad.org/financing-development/ [last accessed on 28 February 2021] 
67 United Nations, 2014, op cit., note 40, p. xi 
68 OECD, 2012, Multilateral aid report. [online]. Paris: OECD Publishing, p, 20. Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/aid-architecture/DCD_DAC(2012)33_FINAL.pdf [last accessed on 15 April 2021] 
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private investment. The latter combines being a development organization and a financial 
institution, seeking how to develop finance solutions at the subnational level. 
The European Union represents the largest provider of ODA. It has a very complex and 
multi-layered financial architecture, receiving public and private investment.69 
And last but not least, multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank at the 
international level, and regional development banks like European Investment Bank, are also 
integrated and funded by countries. They deliver loans and grants to governments and the 
private sector of developing countries, plus technical assistance in implementing and 
monitoring the funded projects.70 The financial aid is concessional when delivered to LDCs, 
and non-concessional when delivered to MICs governments and their private sector firms, 
which are the majority. Sometimes MDBs have provided policy-based loans, which mean 
financing developing governments in exchange of them implementing neoliberal – 
privatization and de-regulation - policy reforms. They are the proxy to earmarking and tied 
aid, and have had controversial bad effects in developing countries. They have also suffered 
from criticisms regarding their accountability avoidance and the lack of transparency. In the 
AAAA (2015)71 it is recognized the significant potential of MDBs and other international 
development banks, but it is also stressed the importance of undertaking internal reforms. 
 
 
2.2.3 The role of Microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
 
MFIs started to proliferate in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, depicted as the decade 
when microfinance started to develop as an industry.72 As a way of delivering development 
aid, their objective was to provide financial services to low-income populations or rural 
isolated areas in developing countries, which had traditionally been marginalized from 
formal financial institutions. Initially they gave microloans – small loans at an affordable 
cost - to individuals and small-businesses in the informal economy which lacked access to 
traditional credit, from the perspective that it would help people get out of poverty and 
become self-sufficient. But the delivery of microloans was already being implemented for 
national governments before. Yet it was Professor Muhammad Yunus who re-shaped the 
mechanism and created the Grameen Bank73 in 1976, which as a community development 
bank would provide financial help to poor entrepreneurial people in Bangladesh. Its success 
 
69 Development Aid, 2020. European funding architecture: An insight into existing instruments and future 
changes. [online] Available at: https://www.developmentaid.org/#!/news-stream/post/57002/european- 
funding-architecture-an-insight-into-existing-instruments-and-future-changes [last accessed on 28 February 
2021]. 
70 Development Aid, 2020. Top multilateral development Banks – an overview. [online] Available at: 
https://www.developmentaid.org/#!/news-stream/post/76903/top-multilateral-development-banks-an- 
overview [last accessed on 28 February 2021] 
71 United Nations, 2021. Multilateral development Banks. [online] United Nations Inter-agency Task Force on 
Financing for Development. Available at: https://developmentfinance.un.org/multilateral-development-banks 
[last accessed on 28 February 2021] 
72 Robinson S., M., 2001. The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the Poor. [ebook]. 
Washington: The World Bank, p. 54. Available at: 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/28956/232500v10REPLA18082134524501PU 
BLIC1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [last accessed on 28 February 2021]. 
73 Grameen Bank, 2021. Grameen Bank – Bank for the Poor. [online]. Available at: https://grameenbank.org 
[last accessed on 28 February 2021] 
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became object of attention for national governments and other organizations around the 
world and has consequentially been widely replicated to other developing countries74. 
Thus, MFIs sought an inclusive approach in relation to financial systems, which 
demonstrated to be overall benefiting. However, there was also the other side of the coin, 
which revealed the limits of microcredit as an anti-poverty tool, arguing that MFIs had been 
responsible for creating more indebtedness and impoverishment.75 In this sense, the 
international community understood that access to financial services (what is known as 
financial inclusion) was key to assure socio-economic development, and more recently to 
achieve the UN SDGs. In this sense, the microfinance system grew and was diversified. On 
one side, more financial tools were made available to better manage their money 
(microcredits, savings, insurances, transfers, payments), with the purpose of generating 
income but also to build assets, smooth consumption and manage risks.76. And, on the other 
side, new players and institutions continue to emerge supporting microfinance and financial 
inclusion. Some of the most relevant are: The Microfinance Network77, the UNCDF78, 
NGOs, some commercial banks, credit unions, local cooperatives. Most recently, technology 
has been introduced in the microfinance industry as a powerful way of expanding access and 
availability to financial services worldwide. Though its full potential is still being discovered, 
the World Bank assured in 2018 that technology (internet and mobile phones) could help 
access financial services to the globally 1.7 billion adults remaining unbanked.79 
 
 
2.2.4 The role of private donors and public-private global funds 
 
Over the last decade the category of private donors has also proliferated into a multiplicity 
of new actors, which are progressively seen as more essential because they can bring 
potentially more economic and technical resources needed to overcome the global 
development challenges. Amongst them, the most significant in terms of contribution are, by 
excellence, private philanthropy and the private commercial sector. Regarding the former, 
in 2018 the OECD80 accounted $7.8 billions of flows – mainly provided by the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, whilst the total ODA was $167.8 billion. Philanthropic actors are 
that well seen because they have a solid structure flexible enough to adapt to new demands 
and partnerships. They are usually more focused to fund social issues, especially in the areas 
 
74 Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018. Master Thesis. Blockchain: Decentralization as the Future of Microfinance and 
Financial Inclusion. Master Student. Hautes Études Commerciales de Paris. 
75 Ibid. 
76 CGAP, 2021. GCAP: Empowering the poor through financial services. [online]. Available at: 
https://www.cgap.org/ [last accessed on 28 February 2021] 
77 Created in 1993, the MFN is compounded by 25 microfinance world leaders serving over 100 million clients 
in 23 different countries. Those members are commercial banks, financial institutions and NGOs. 
https://microfinancenetwork.org 
78 In 1990s started supporting microcredit institutions, and established as the leader in the field of microfinance. 
(Microfinance Network, 2021. Microfinance Network: A global community of leading microfinance players. 
[online]. Available at: https://www.uncdf.org/ [last accessed on 28 February 2021]). 
79 World Bank, 2018. Financial Inclusion on the Rise, But Gaps Remain, Global Findex Database Shows. 
[online]. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/04/19/financial-inclusion-on- 
the-rise-but-gaps-remain-global-findex-database-shows [last accessed on 28 February 2021] 
80 OECD, 2019. The role of philanthropy in financing for development. [online]. Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/beyond-oda- 
foundations.htm [last accessed on 28 February 2021] 
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of education and health. Along with the private commercial sector, both private donors are 
become more protagonists in the international development system because they are 
massively introducing new types of disruptive technologies with the commitment of 
contributing to more ambitious development purposes, e.g. with the use of blockchain or 
Artifical Intelligence. But, aside from the innovation effervescence, the exponential reliance 
of development finance to private donors could pose serial threats towards public accounting 
structures or the democratization of financial development aid. A challenge that this article 
will try to refute in the subsequent charters, by arguing, again, for the implementation of a 
multi-stakeholder development governance as the way of coordinating, securing, and 
streamlining the delivery of financial development aid. 
 
 
Table 2. Critical actors of the International Development Finance System 
 
Source: OECD DAC/DCD and OECD Development Centre (2006)81 
 
 
2.3 The evolution of financial development aid: the case of microfinance 
 
After World War II and the implementation of the US Marshall Plan in 1947 to recover the 
devastated European continent, foreign aid in the form of ODA became the main financial 
instrument for developing international cooperation.82 As noted in the previous chapter, ODA 
is a top-down instrument that donor countries continue to use in a bilateral or multilateral 
 
81 Cohen, D., Drechsler, D., Jütting, J., Reisen, H., Solignac Lecompte, H, Zimmermann, F., 2007. Financing 
Development: Aid and beyond. Development Centre Perspectives. [online]. Paris: OECD Publishing, p. 12. 
Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/development/financing-development_9789264027596-en#page8 
[last accessed on 29 February 2021]. 
82 Lacalle Calderon, M., Alfonso Gil, J., Rico-Garrido, S., “Foreign Aid and Microfinance: A new policy 
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way towards developing countries. However, it has not been exempted of criticisms precisely 
about the donors’ interests when delivering the aid and the expected effects on receiving 
countries. Indeed, the Academia has repeatedly and vastly highlighted the big differences 
that “exist between the declared objective of any particular policy intervention, and the 
hidden political agenda drawn up by the main international development institutions and the 
rich country governments that control these institutions.”83 With this context, during the last 
decades the international community has been immersed in multiple debates about how to 
improve the efficacy and efficiency of the international development cooperation system. 
Alternatively, new financial instruments emerged as a critical response to this macro 
approach to development that ODA represented. The case of microfinance (MF) has probably 
been the most notorious and important, because it means the opposite vision and practice to 
traditional aid development approaches. It is configured as a bottom-up instrument targeting 
poor individuals and small-businesses in the informal economy which have been prevented 
from accessing traditional banks. It is an anti-poverty tool based on providing micro financial 
services directly to local people – most of them loans- taking into consideration their needs 
and with the objective of generating income, increasing consumption, strengthening small 
business, creating more jobs and ultimately of creating resilience and boosting the local 
economy. It has a more sustainable focus because it builds upon local’s demands and aims at 
achieving the world’s financial inclusion. An approach to which the international community 
has been progressively transitioning to, viewing MF as a necessary complement to financial 
development.84 In this sense, since the 1980s and especially the 1990s-decade MF gained the 
attention of a variety of actors worldwide, shifting into a commercialized de-regulated 
growing industry.85 As MIX Market shows,86 in 2017, 762 MFIs were reported. Year over 
year lending growth remained steady at a rate of 9.8% in the number of active borrowers and 
14.3% in the gross loan portfolio. In absolute numbers meant that the number of active 
borrowers grew to 120 million and the gross loan portfolio stood at $112 billion. 
Nevertheless, the global positive trend of MF cannot escape what many voices have raised 
in the last years,87 and this is the uncertainty about whether or not it has contributed to 
improve or rather worsen the levels of poverty, debt, growth and development of the 
receiving countries. Indeed, some of them even point out that in reality the microcredit model 
has been successful in penetrating the neoliberal political agenda at the local level, 
“effectively helping developing states to “lock in” in a state of under-development.”88 Those 
critiques have served to re-think how microfinance institutions could be transformed in a way 
they could address multiple market failures and thus effectively provide durable positive 
impacts to communities. Quasi intuitively, the light has been put in the disruptive role that 
technology and big tech companies can produce in the financial development aid sector, with 
the proliferation of digital platforms of peer-to-peer micro-lending. 
 
83 Bateman, M., “The Rise and Fall of Muhamad Yunus and the Microcredit Model”, International Development 
Studies, 2014, no. 1, p. 26 
84 Lacalle Calderon, M., et al. 2015, op. cit., note 83, p. 108. 
85 Bateman, M., op. cit., note 84, p. 2 
86 MIX, 2019. Global Outreach and Financial Performance Benchmark Report 2017-2018. [online]. FinDev 
Gateway, pp. 1-2. Available at: 
https://www.findevgateway.org/sites/default/files/publications/files/mix_market_global_outreach_financial_b 
enchmark_report_2017-2018_1.pdf [last accessed on 1 March 2021] 
87 Lacalle Calderon, M., et al. 2015, op. cit., note 83, p. 1. 
88 Bateman, M., op. cit., note 84, p. 18 
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In the following section it will be argued that the microcredit model acts as an antipoverty 
tool, moving from its initial purpose with the foundation of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh 
to the commercialization of the industry, with examples such as the Yunus Social Business 
and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor. With this it will be assessed to what extent 
this complementary approach to development represented a failure for the international 
community, and how new digital platforms offer the opportunity to implement MF’s whole 
transformative potential by bringing efficiency delivery gains. 
 
 
2.3.1 Microcredit as an antipoverty tool: from the Grameen Bank Model to the 
commercialization of Microfinance 
 
In 1976 Professor Muhammad Yunus from Bangladesh created a research project on how to 
design a credit delivery system for the rural and poor people that could help to reduce poverty 
rates and also stimulate small businesses in the country. Those small loans were meant to 
represent star-up money at an affordable cost, so with lower interest rates than those of 
traditional banks, since the target groups never had the opportunity to access banking 
services. They were always evaluated as high-risk clients due to their lack of guarantors and 
collateral, and thus thought as unable to save or repay a loan or launch a business that could 
generate profits.89 They were left alone, not even included in the nation’s economy, with the 
only possibility of resorting to different types of “loan sharks” that would lend the money 
with extreme and predatory attached conditions. In contraposition, the main principle 
defended by Yunus was that microcredit was more effective than charity in terms of 
alleviating poverty and development because it was focused on solidarity lending. In trusting 
the potential of people to become self-employed through their own micro-financed 
businesses, from the perspective that poverty was not created by poor people, but rather a 
condition imposed by the system which prevented them from doing what they were capable 
of. Then, instead of calling those people as “informal sector”, what they needed was to be 
included and countered in the nation’s economy as the “micro-entrepreneurial sector” 
because this is what they were doing, undertaking different activities to survive. With this 
mindset, Yunus founded the Grameen Bank in 1983 as an independent not-for-profit 
development bank with the purpose of creating social businesses. From his point of view, the 
banking system should be used for bringing wealth from the top to the bottom, investing in 
social businesses that could help people progress make people grow u90 
Microcredit was considered for Yunus a tool for socioeconomic development of the 
communities, and initially only included the provision of microloans to those lacking of 
credit. He thought that giving small amounts of money to poor entrepreneurs and small 
businesses will be the most efficient policy to combat poverty and improve the standards of 
living of the communities, because it would activate the chain of strengthening small 
businesses, generating income, increasing consumption and creating more jobs, which 
ultimately would resort in more resilience and a boost to local economy. In addition, it would 
 
 
89 Lacalle Calderon, M., et al. 2015, op. cit., note 83, p. 115. 
90 News Berkeley, 2020. “Father of microfinance” Muhammad Yunus talks Student leadership, COVID-19. 
[online]. Available at: https://news.berkeley.edu/2020/11/13/father-of-microfinance-muhammad-yunus-talks- 
student-leadership-covid-19/ [last accessed on 28 February 2021] 
23 
 
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona Nº 5/2021, 22 DE JUNIO DE 
2021 COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA 
Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
improve the levels of nutrition and sanitation, the quality of houses, and prevent families 
from pulling out children of schools to put them to work. 
Among the targeted people, Yunus especially focused on women – obtaining more than 95% 
of the loans - as they have historically suffered more restrictions to access ordinary credits or 
even generate incomes due to the patriarchal gender roles. With this, women became more 
empowered in the society, but also more reliable in the eyes of the lenders. They found 
women tend to share better the existing resources among the family and allocate it better 
depending on the priorities, and achieve a 99% of repayment rate.91 
The provisions for the delivery of the loans relied on two types of mechanisms. The first one 
was to establish a relationship between the bank and the entrepreneurial person. The second 
was to establish a relationship between the bank and several entrepreneurs which were 
applying for the loan and other services. In both cases the system was based on trust, without 
establishing written legal contracts nor formal joint liabilities to assure the repayment. Loans 
had a sufficient long-term period to enable borrowers to generate the sufficient income after 
which they would have to make a weekly repayment. 
As said, the main challenge of microcredit was to provide loans at an affordable cost, 
estimated by taking into consideration administrative and transactions costs by the bank 
(offices, salaries, a personalized service, microfinance operations relatives to loan size, etc). 
A very difficult task that resulted in high interest and fee rates above 30% on average92, which 
borrowers had to pay along with their own transaction costs such as travelling and negotiating 
with the bank, acquiring all the required documentation, etc. While MF’s operators argued 
those costs were unavoidable if the objective was to provide financial inclusion to everyone, 
the reality showed that in most cases those costs turned to be unacceptable for the population. 
It became a bottleneck when people had to earn at least up to the percentage rate of return if 
they did not want to end up poorer than they were before accepting the loan. Thus, putting 
them in jeopardy because it was highly improbable that they could fulfill and actually obtain 
benefits. This triggered the critique that the high costs of traditional microfinance loans were 
indeed limiting their effectiveness as a poverty-fighting tool. Which resulted in the 
controversial debate about whether or not the foundational approach to microcredit was being 
achieved, if poor people were ending up paying the highest cost. 
Notwithstanding this, in the 1980s decade the Grameen model started to gain a lot of attention 
from the international community because its data showed two things. The first, that 
microcredit could provide a large-scale outreach profitability.93 And the second, that besides 
the high-interest rates critique, people still responded with a high repayment rate and a low 
default of the loans.94 In such a vein, many international development agencies and US right 
wing foundations started to financially support the idea, attracted by the fusion between 
capitalism and social responsibility, as well as by the relationship that microcredit could 
 
91 Hardvard Business Review, 2012. Muhammad Yunus. [online] Hardvard Business Review. Available at: 
https://hbr.org/2012/12/muhammad-yunus [last accessed on 4 February 2021] 
92 MacFarquhar, N. 2010. Banks Making Big Profits From Tiny Loans. [online]. Available at: 
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/14/world/14microfinance.html?pagewanted=all [last accessed on 8 
February 2021] 
93 The ability to reach poor and isolated people. Robinson S., M., 2001. op. cit., note 73, p. 54 
94 Karlan, D., Mann, r., Kendall, J., Pande, R., Suri, T., Zinman, J., 2016. Making Microfinance More Effective. 
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mean for development. Then many and multiple models of microcredit institutions started to 
emerge and expand worldwide, serving diverse needs to different types of population. 
During the 1980s and the 1990s MF was inevitably starting to develop as an industry, but 
some fundamental practices needed to be changed in order to achieve its full potential. Up to 
this point, the Grameen Bank and other microcredit institutions relied mostly upon subsidies 
from external development agencies and national governments.95 But then international 
development policies also got affected by the neoliberal context, and the microcredit model 
suffered a radical transformation, shifting from relying to subsidies to a market-driven 
orientation. Under the USAID domination as the world’s most important international 
development agency, this meant a reorientation towards the commercialization and de- 
regulation of the microcredit idea, from a not-for-profit work towards a financially self- 
sustainable for-profit model.96 In such a fashion, at that time the UNCDF also started 
supporting microcredit institutions, establishing itself as the leader in the field of MF. As an 
autonomous voluntary funded UN organization affiliated with the UNDP, it has always 
worked for the poor in the 46 least developed countries. Indeed, it was established in 1966 
already with the purpose of assisting those countries in their process of development by the 
means of supplementing existing sources of capital assistance with grants and loans.97 
Bolivia became the first country in which this neoliberal microcredit model was hugely 
implemented98 with the creation of the microfinance bank BancoSol in 1993. Other important 
examples are Compartamos Banco, created in Mexico in 1990 and nowadays the largest 
microfinance bank in Latin America or the Equity Bank created in Kenya in 1984 shifting 
from a microfinance to the commercial largest bank in Africa. On the contrary, other MFI 
institutions managed to continue under their own initial not-for-profit orientation. Both best 
examples are from Bangladesh, being the first the same Grameen Bank, which started to get 
most of its funding from the central bank of Bangladesh, and the BRAC, and NGO created in 
1972 and one of the largest MF providers in the world. 
At the beginning of the 2000s the Microfinance Industry (MFI) grew and spread around the 
world with the purpose of becoming a consolidated commercial sector. It was, indeed, the 
international development community’s most generously funded and supposedly most 
effective anti-poverty intervention.99 Their role was even more important since poor 
population was also increasing and they were to satisfy the unmet demand on a larger scale. 
However, in order for this to be possible the MFI started to understand that a new paradigm 
was needed. New principles and standards were to be applied to tackle institutional 
inefficiencies and better adjust to the different needs of the people. In fact, strong evidence100 
was starting to come again stressing the limits and ineffectiveness of microcredit as an anti- 
poverty tool. Concretely, it pointed that microcredit did not only fail to increase borrowers’ 
income but rather drove them to a debt trap.101 As the succeeding ratio for those kinds of 
 
95 Bateman, M., op. cit., note 84, p. 5 
96 Ibid. 
97 UNCDF, 2021. History – UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). [online]. Available at: 
https://www.uncdf.org/history [last accessed on 17 February 2021] 
98 Bateman, M., op. cit., note 84, p. 5 
99 Ibid, p. 3 
100 Ibid, p. 24; Roodman, D., 2012. Due Dilligence. Washington, D.C: Centre for Global Development; Barder, 
O., 2021. Aid Effectiveness: Being Clear about Objectives. [Blog]. CGAP, Available at: 
https://www.cgap.org/blog/aid-effectiveness-being-clear-about-objectives [last accessed on 17 February 2021] 
101 Bateman, M., op. cit., note 84, p. 7 
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small businesses was highly uncertain, people in most cases used the loans for consumption, 
sometimes acquiring more than one to other companies. Then, microcredit also failed in its 
empowerment task and in its objective of improving overall living standards, especially the 
better levels of nutrition and school enrollment. 
In response, in 2004 the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor102 (CGAP) developed the 
“Key Principles of Microfinance”103 aimed at addressing how microfinance could become a 
powerful tool to combat poverty. Among those, they accepted the limitations of the loans by 
recognizing that poor households also needed access to different financial services when, for 
example, they were without income or could not repay. Therefore, they introduced loans, 
savings, insurance and money transfer services. Microloans would continue the task of 
generating income and building new assets in the form of small-businesses. Savings accounts 
would help them to balance their consumption and also to better cope with risks. And 
insurance would allow them to keep the businesses’ earning in the event of illness, medical 
expenses, or natural disasters.104 
However, besides all the intended efforts to improve the MF model, when the global financial 
crisis started to become real in 2007, the attacks to it became even harder because at the 
macro level it continued to prove that on average it was not having a positive impact in 
alleviating poverty. Nor it was increasing the levels of income and net employment.105 In a 
way, the government of the UK conducted a systematic review and found that all the previous 
positive evidence of microcredit in developing countries could not be reliable because it has 
always been conducted by interested parties.106 Critiques were now more profound, attacking 
the fundamental idea for which the contemporary microcredit model was no longer a bottom- 
up redistributive mechanism challenging the political and economic system, but rather it was 
just “legitimizing and perpetuating it”.107 The first argument to support it was the fact of 
constructing a narrative and a practice in which the only way out of poverty and development 
was by starting small businesses. Following the neoliberal individualist logic for which 
everyone could be capable of doing it and fortunate enough of benefiting from it. And yet 
this represented a fundamental misunderstanding of some social and economic social 
development principles. The first, the assumption that in these poor communities there would 
be enough spending power thanks to which the increasing supply would match with the 
demand. Put it in other words, it was believed that “local supply of goods and services would 
create its own demand to absorb it,” a failed assumption commonly made in anti-poverty and 
development actions.108 
In the microcredit case, it enhanced the creation of massive supply of basic goods and 
services at a low price, but did not consider how income would be generated to allow the 
 
102 Global Partnership of 30 leading public and private development organisations, including bilateral and 
multilateral agencies, private foundations and development finance institutions. It encompasses the most 
important donors in the development field. It is administered by the World Bank as a trustee, but it has a separate 
governance and funding. 
103 GCAP, 2004. Key Principles on Microfinance. [PDF]. Washington: CGAP, pp. 1-2. Available at: 
https://www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/researches/documents/CGAP-Consensus-Guidelines-Key-Principles- 
of-Microfinance-Jan-2004.pdf [last accessed on 1 March 2021] 
104 Lacalle Calderon, M., et al. 2015, op. cit., note 83, p. 116. 
105 Ibid, p. 9 
106 Ibid, p. 7 
107 Ibid, p. 4 
108 Ibid, p. 8 
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people to actually purchase the items. In fact, the expanding unnecessary supply of old and 
new items increased the competitiveness but also reduced the profits per capita of these 
small-business owners, therefore increasing the risk of failure. A situation that could easily 
condemn more people into situations of more poverty and insecurity, because in order to 
repay the loan they would be forced to use savings, reduce consumption, sell familiar assets, 
etc. Moreover, the creation of small businesses allowed larger businesses to take advantage 
of their vulnerability, by purchasing their items at a lower cost, knowing they were not 
unionized, they could not pay taxes, neither able to respect health or labor legislation. This 
contributed to exacerbate inequalities and disparities among the population. And finally, the 
commercialization and de-regulation process that affected the microcredit model also 
included a severe privatization round of the most basic services (health care, water and 
education) in developing countries. Thus, poor people were also being paid (accessing to 
microloans) to secure their access and consumption of those goods and services. 
This negative impact on the poor came along with exposures of malpractices in the MFI, with 
different actors at the top of the industry – owners, individual donors, managers, etc - having 
gained spectacular profits at the expenses of over-expanding the businesses and over- 
indebting the people. It was a situation of “accumulation by dispossession”109that 
paradoxically had gained the positive attention and the social legitimacy of the international 
development community as a whole. The African continent would be a great example for this 
precise situation, because while it still holds the highest rates of poverty in the world it is the 
place with more microenterprises and self-employed people. Microcredit continues to arrive 
from the developed world, but it is being wrongly directed. The same happened in 
Bangladesh, where the poverty has been reduced but microcredit has not had any direct effect 
in it, but rather has inflicted a lot of microcredit borrowers into high levels of indebtedness.110 
On the contrary, in Latin America the same Inter-American Development Bank admitted that 
the market-driven microcredit model introduced in the 1990s did not serve any of its 
purposes. Poverty and inequality raised because a lot of businesses were enhanced but none 
of them guaranteeing enough productivity rates to produce benefits. 
In this context of Microfinance seeming to be in real threat, the MFI had to find a way to 
recover its legitimacy and continuing operating in the field. In such a vein, they redefined it 
through the broader concept of “financial inclusion” to mean that providing poor people 
access to different services of the financial system – essentially by having a bank account, 
through which to save, pay and transfer by the mobile phone, and to access credit savings, 
insurance - will help them develop and get out of poverty.111 Another assumption that can be 
thought as going in the wrong direction, putting a lot of effort in the financial sector rather 
than providing these people with the basic social services and infrastructures needed to 
overcome inequalities and generate income.112 Nevertheless, many studies made by the 
World Bank and others in multiple parts of the world113 found out a “positive relation 
 
109 Harvey, D., 2006. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
110 World Bank, 2013. Bangladesh Poverty Assessment: A Decade of Progress in Reducing Poverty, 2000-2010. 
[online]. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/06/20/bangladesh-poverty- 
assessment-a-decade-of-progress-in-reducing-poverty-2000-2010 [last accessed on 17 March 2021] 
111 World Bank, 2012. Global Financial Development Report 2013: Rethinking the Role of the State in Finance. 
[online]. Washington: World Bank. Available at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/11848 
[last accessed on 25 February 2021]; Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018. op. cit., note 75. 
112 Bateman, M., op. cit., note 84, p. 25 
113 Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018. op. cit., note 75. 
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between the Financial Depth (the ratio of private credit to GDP) and the change in the share 
of the lowest quintile in total national expendable income,” which implies that providing 
major access to financial services contributes to a general economic growth and also to raise 
the levels of income of those citizens with less economic resources. 
Related to this, Professor Yunus did recognize the bad effects that the commercialization and 
de-regulation movement could have caused to people in some places of the world, but still 
maintained its position in favor of it as a good mechanism to correct unemployment and 
poverty after the global financial crisis. Indeed, in 2011 he founded the Yunus Social Business 
(YSB),114 a social business fund focused at financing and investing in strong social business 
in developing countries dedicated to reduce poverty and enhance development. However, 
they can only apply for financing or investment those businesses that can declare themselves 
as solid – creating jobs, generating income and creating a positive impact into society – and 
thus can be clearly scalable,115 that contribute to the achievement of the UN SDGs can 
actually apply for financing. In this sense, this low-cost capital is the middle option for those 
social businesses that cannot access commercial banks, because they are bigger than they 
need, nor microcredit because it is too small. In Yunus words, “it is a new and more humane 
form of capitalism.”116 
With this rapid review of the evolution of microcredit from 1970s onwards, it would be fair 
to say that its success as an anti-poverty tool in developing countries remains uncertain. Data 
shows the model has been replicated to more than 43 countries in the world, and according 
to MIX Market,117 in 2017, 762 MFIs were reported. Year over year lending growth remained 
steady at a rate of 9.8% in the number of active borrowers and 14.3% in the gross loan 
portfolio. In absolute numbers meant that the number of active borrowers grew to 120 million 
and the gross loan portfolio stood at $112 billion. In fact, in MF we can also identify the 
macro-micro paradox.118 Meaning that while there is no solid evidence of the positive impact 
that MF has produced in the macroeconomic activity, at the micro level we can either find 
positive, neutral and negative results. The positive effects have been observed when the MFIs 
have been well-managed119 – with sustainable procedures both for the MFIs, the donors, the 
borrowers and the communities -, being able to generate, in this order: a tremendous increase 
in the number of saving accounts, which in turn has smoothed consumption among the poor 
and has allowed them to start new businesses. Automatically those new businesses have 
created new jobs but at the same time have not negatively affected the poor population which 
already had a job.120 The increase in the occupation rate has facilitated a durable 
consumption, and also has allowed more families to access education and better health. 
Finally, social capital has emerged among those MF clients, as a result of sharing 
experiences, generating knowledge, helping each other, etc. 
 
114 Yunus Social Business, 2021. Yunus Social Business. [online] Yunus Social Business. Available at: 
www.yunussb.com/blog/tag/Global+Social+Business+Summit [last accessed on 2 March 2021] 
115 Term used to refer when a business grows, by making more money and increasing its market share faster 
than its costs. 
116 Bateman, M., op. cit., note 84, p. 22; Yunus, M., 2007. Creating a world without poverty: Social business 
and the future of capitalism. New York: Public Affairs; Yunus, M., 2010. Building Social Business: The New 
Kind of Capitalism that Serves Humanity’s Most Pressing Needs. New York: Public Affairs 
117 MIX, 2019. op. cit., note 87 
118 Lacalle Calderon, M., et al. 2015, op. cit., note 83, p. 119. 
119 Ibid. 
120 Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018. op. cit., note 75. 
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Nevertheless, to affirm that the contribution of microcredit as anti-poverty tool remains 
doubtful does not imply that this complementary approach121 to development has meant a 
failure for the international community. Indeed, what this review has served is to 
acknowledge that its main problem derives or from its theoretical approach or from its 
practical way of operating. Both aspects can turn microcredit and MF into a failed policy, but 
if oriented and managed adequately it can have a great potential to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of development. Moreover, it can decisively contribute to meet the 17 UN 
SDGs,122 as it is estimated that an increasing of $2,5 trillion of funding will be needed to 
achieve them by 2030.123 It is, thus, a matter of formulating sustainable MF strategies that 
will produce more benefits to the developing societies, whilst reducing the costs both for the 
lender and the borrower side. New financial strategies that can only be well-implemented if 
they identify and overcome the underlying market failures and conditions of every 
developing country context. Nevertheless, what this historic review helps us to understand 
is that financial strategies are per se complementary to development, meaning that other 
actions, mainly through public interventions, will be needed to address those market failures 
at the same time.124 
In this vein, the present work proposes to implement a bottom-up approach to MF, in which 
financial options are not a one-size-fits-all125 but rather adapted to every borrower’ situation. 
Precisely, this new feature emerges from the criticism made to microcredit saying that was 
in a way patronized because it did not leverage enough all the aspects surrounding the 
borrower nor its needs. What happened then was a situation of information asymmetry 
between the supply-lender side and the demand-consumer side, a very common condition for 
market failure. The supply-lender side had to manage two evident scenarios, the adverse 
selection and the moral hazard. The first meant that lenders were in trouble to identify which 
clients would be more or less risky because they were not engaging in its capabilities to 
return. The second meant that lenders were also in trouble to know how much effort and care 
clients would need to return or to avoid more losses. On the other side, the consumers were 
in a clear situation of vulnerability. They were in need for money and thus they accepted to 
access MF services, even if in some cases they might not have the resources nor the 
knowledge to understand the different types of products, the conditions, let alone to contrast 
if those options were adequate enough according to their situation. Somewhat this was largely 
triggered after the commercialization and de-regulation of the microcredit model. Also, some 
of those consumers could face incomplete property rights, basically difficulties in having the 
 
 
121 Referring to MF as a complementary approach derives from the fact that, contrary to what Yunus and 
neoliberal elites thought at that time, the capacity to combat poverty and to develop in a bigger scale does not 
rely on the individuals nor on its entrepreneurial personality. Rather, it is achieved when massive public 
investment is being allocated to transform and improve social basic infrastructures from which to provide the 
population with the basic social needs. The guaranteed provision of those social needs is what would rise the 
living standards of the population, contributing to decrease the levels of inequality among the population. 
122 GCAP, 2004. op cit., note 104. 
123 United Nations, 2019. Citing $2,5 Trillion Annual Financing Gap during SDG Business Forum Event, 
Deputy Secretary-General Says Poverty Falling Too Slowly. [online]. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/dsgsm1340.doc.htm [last accessed on 2 March 2021] 
124 Karlan, D., Mann, R., Kendall, J., Pande, R., Suri, T., Zinman, J., 2016. op cit., note 95. 
125 Karlan D., Kendall, J. Mann, R., Pande, R., Suri, T., Zinman, J., 2016. Research and impacts of digital 
financial services. NBER Working Paper Series. [online]. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
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whole control over its properties and assets, like many women continue to face, which can in 
turn reduce their access to financial services but also their capacity to return them. 
Additionally, another market failure condition that was identified was that high transaction 
costs were contributing to major inefficiencies of the microcredit model. For the consumer, 
those costs mainly derived from the fact that banks were sometimes located far away from 
rural populations, they were offering poor services and long-wait times, they were requiring 
different documents and to meet specific financial or economic criteria, or even high- 
withdrawal fees. Indeed, clients need extensive monitoring and interaction with loan officers 
in order to benefit from and repay their loans. So basically, the three major barriers that the 
poor faced when trying to access MF services were the time, the cost, and the difficulty to 
obtain an identity and to continue engaged in the whole process up until the whole return of 
the credit.126 
As argued previously, the economic theory suggests that correcting those market failures is 
the way to boost the financial market’s full potential, in developing countries too. Then, if 
we want the MF to be more effective and efficient, the sustainable strategies need to facilitate 
the following aspects:127 
1) Symmetric and free information flows for both sides 
2) Rational choses from both sides according to their capacities 
3) The enforcement and protection of rights from both sides 
4) Low entry barriers and transaction costs for the consumers 
5) More transparency and good governance 
Quasi intuitively, recent evidence is pointing that those sustainable strategies need to take 
into consideration the disruptive potential technology can have in the development field, and 
particular in the financial development sector. Concretely, digital platforms can improve the 
effectivity and efficiency of MF services128 because they can tackle all those market failures 
largely present in developing countries, and do it by moving a bit closer to the bottom-up 
approach suggested before. Firstly, they reduce transaction costs, since all the procedures can 
be made digitally no matter where the person is129 and secondly, information asymmetries 
reduce because both sides can be in constant contact. This, in turn, favors a closer relationship 
between the lender and consumer, which is directly associated with higher repayment rates. 
From the lenders’ side the adverse selection happens digitally following certain algorithms 
that calculate the needs and the concrete situation of the borrower. From the borrowers’ side, 
digital platforms can introduce simplified on-time guides to explain all the options and 
procedures available to obtain the products that best fit according to their needs and particular 
situations. Thirdly, digital platforms can facilitate innovations in product and service design 
according to the targeted population. And fourthly, digital platforms can broaden the reach 
of financial products, especially to remote areas which otherwise would experiment serious 
difficulties to reach a traditional bank, as it is the problem nowadays. Indeed, while 1.7 billion 
adults in developing countries remain unbanked130 - 56% of which are women-, many of 
them do have mobile phones and internet connectivity (see Table 3). Thus, as said by the 
 
126 Ibid, p. 5 
127 Karlan, D., Mann, R., Kendall, J., Pande, R., Suri, T., Zinman, J., 2016. op cit., note 95. 
128 Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018. op. cit., note 75. 
129 Karlan, D., Mann, R., Kendall, J., Pande, R., Suri, T., Zinman, J., 2016. op cit., note 126, p. 5 
130 World Bank, 2018, op cit., note 80. 
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World Bank in 2018 and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, technology could help 
to bring all these unbanked people the financial services they need, through mobile money 
accounts or app financial accounts.131 
In this sense, digital platforms offer major efficiency gain possibilities because they can 
facilitate the alignment between the MF models, which can be private and public, and those 
services which would more effectively benefit the poor. Basically because the latter would 
be more empowered, would have a major capacity to decide the financial services that wants, 
and this will give lenders major incentives to adjust their preferences with those expressed 
needs. Also, digital platforms reduce the possibility of corruption when transferring money132 
and can increase the scalability of financial services because the revenues that poor 
households might obtain from it would be lower than the costs.133 
The emergence of digital platforms offering financial services is a phenomenon that began 
in the late 2000s, in response to the technological boom. Its rapid and constant advancement 
offers infinite new business opportunities, like the FinTech companies represent. These are 
different types of technological companies – meaning big, small or even startups – devoted 
to offer financial services to those in need in developing countries, with the possibility of 
reaching far more people than traditional providers can: banks (public and private), MFIs, 
credit unions and cooperatives.134 These new private actors have shown the positive impact 
that digital platforms and technologies can produce in the financial development arena. A 
contribution that other actors have recognized as important and necessary, to the extent that 






















131 CGAP, 2021. Frequently Asked Questions about Financial inclusion. [online]. CGAP. Available at: 
https://www.cgap.org/about/faq [last accessed on 25 March 2021] 
132 Ibid 
133 UNCDF, 2021. Strategic Framework 2018-2021 – UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). [online]. 
Available at: https://www.uncdf.org/article/3207/strategic-framework-2018-21 [last accessed on 3 February 
2021] 
134 CGAP, 2021. op. cit., note 132. 
135 UNCDF, 2021. Inclusive Digital Economies – UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). [online]. Available 
at: https://www.uncdf.org/inclusive-digital-economies [last accessed on 3 February 2021] 
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Source: Global Findex Database136 
Note: Data are not displayed for economies where the share of adults without an account is 5 percent or less. 
 
 
2.3.2 Digital finance services can bring efficiency delivery gains 
 
During the 2000s decade internet connection and mobile phones started to expand in 
developing countries as a central part of international and local development policies, and 
also of initiatives coming from private NGOs and for-profit companies.137 It was thought that 
“mobile technology could serve as key accelerator and ensure no one was left behind in the 
development process.”138 As part of it, small scale digital financial programs started to be 
tested with the aim of fostering the financial inclusion of all those citizens in developing 
countries which still remained unbanked. In this sense, digital financial inclusion was not a 
final goal per se, but rather a very effective mean for poor households to engage, participate 
and benefit from the multiple services in the formal local economy. Moreover, those benefits 
could be achieved more efficiently because digital platforms had the possibility of reducing 
many market failures that prevented many people from leaving the informal economy. Such 
potential was based on its own architecture, which could facilitate access to infinite types of 
services and allow a direct and constant contact with those services and people. But most 
importantly, its feasibility relied on the effort of financial operators to understand every 
particular country context, its market, the socioeconomic structure, and the role local agents 




136 World Bank, 2018, op cit., note 80. 
137 UNCDF, 2019. Leaving no one behind in the digital era [PDF]. pp. 1-6. Available at: 
https://www.uncdf.org/article/4931/global-strategy-leaving-no-one-behind-in-the-digital-era [last accessed on 
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Since then, public and private stakeholders have work intensively in more developing 
countries to develop multiple sources of finance using different types of technology, 
following the commitments expressed in the AAAA and 2030 Agenda of 2015. Among those, 
the ones falling within the scope of this work are: the UNCDF, the traditional MicroFinance 
Institutions, and the FinTech companies. Both three have been selected because they 
represent the current multi-stakeholder partnership found in many financial development 
interventions. Each of them provide different resources and capacities, contributing to meet 
unmet demands and closing existing development gaps between the population. 
The UNCDF is a critical actor in the field of financial inclusion, as reveals its two-decades 
experience in expanding inclusive financial markets and local development finance 
systems.139 Through digital platforms, it has managed to reach 18 million people using 
mobile financial services in 28 developing countries in East and West Africa, Asia and the 
Pacific. This country-presence has given UNCDF experts a broader knowledge on how to 
effectively expand digital finance in all those developing countries. As a development 
organization and financial institution, UNCDF uses ODA to provide investment capital in 
the form of grants, soft loans and credit enhancements, and technical assistance to both the 
public (local governments) and the private sector (domestic banks). It acts mainly at the 
subnational level, as an early stage investor to de-risk financial opportunities that can be 
leveraged by institutional financial partners and private sector investors.140 
The digitalization of financial development aid has been part of formal UNDP Strategic 
Plans, especially in the last ones of 2014-2017 and 2018-2021. In both it is targeted the 
achievement of UN SDGs number 1 (“No poverty”) and number 17 (“Partnership for the 
Goals”) in the 46 LDCs, since it is recognized that most of the money that goes to LDCs 
often concentrates in specific countries and sectors, basically extractive industries, real estate 
or narrow infrastructure corridors.141 The way that UNCDF plans to achieve innovative 
finance solutions is through three strategies. The first is one of financial inclusion making 
use of digital and other new technologies. The second one is focused on the local 
development finance to drive public and private funding towards the expansion of local and 
sustainable economies. The third, the LDCs investment platform to support local 
infrastructures and businesses in the last mile. These are all those “niche market opportunities 
where finance is not yet flowing predictably because of real and perceived risk; where there 
is a potential to mobilize additional capital flows; and where there is scope to achieve 
significant development results.”142 Those three strategies are approached in collaboration 
with public and private entities from around the world, like the Better than Cash Alliance.143 
It is a UN partnership of 77 members, including 32 governments, 28 international 
organizations, 8 companies and 9 resources partners. It is aimed at accelerating the transition 





139 UNCDF, 2021., op. cit., note 134 
140 UNCDF, 2019., op. cit., note 138 
141 UNCDF, 2021., op. cit., note 134 
142 UNCDF, 2021. Least Developed Countries Investment Platform. [online]. Available at: 
https://www.uncdf.org/least-developed-countries-investment-platform [last accessed on 20 February 2021] 
143 Better than Cash Alliance, 2021. [online]. Available at: https://www.betterthancash.org/# [last accessed on 
20 February 2021] 
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finance services brings with cost savings, increases transparency and major efficiency 
delivery gains.144 
Traditional MicroFinance institutions and mainstream banks are also engaged in the idea of 
facilitating the financial inclusion and financial payments through the development of digital 
ecosystems in developing countries.145 Indeed, technological innovation in the microfinance 
industry is inevitable, to the point that MFIs will be obliged to digitalize either their 
information gathering processes and/or their delivery channels if they want to continue being 
competitive and survive.146 They serve a strategic role because of their investment 
possibilities, their vast network of local contacts and clients, and their extensive knowledge 
of local economies. This is why UNCDF also engages with them using a calibrated and risk- 
informed mix of instruments to develop finance solutions in LDCs. However, MFIs in 
particular might face important challenges when substituting face-to-face human 
interactions, because the building of trust has been the main aspect making MF to succeed in 
developing countries. This was somewhat experienced by M-Pesa, a popular payment and 
microcredit system through mobile phones invented in Kenya in 2007.147 The level of success 
has been that it is used by 96% of the rural population, it has lifted an estimate of 2% of the 
country’s households and it has empowered 185 thousand women to move into SMEs148. 
As new emerging actors, private fintech companies and foundations are becoming key 
players when accessing more finance for local development. They have plenty of economic 
and technical resources that are progressively being devoted to prove how new types of 
disruptive technologies can make a change in advancing financial inclusion and 
development. However, there is no consensus on which kind of technology and architecture 
could bring the best results for MicroFinance industry.149 Because of this, it felt interesting 
to highlight the case of the peer-to-peer digital platforms,150 alternative financial services 
created by private companies to expand the availability of microcredit to the micro- 
entrepreneurs in the developing world. The difference from MFI is that, in this case, the 
lenders are not institutions but rather individual investors from all over the world, who can 
choose to which borrowers to lend. As an online service, those platforms match lenders with 
borrowers at a lower cost than MFIs and traditional banks would do. For the borrower, 
interest rates are lower, set by the competing lenders or by the intermediary company. And 
for the lender, low entry investment amounts are required. Moreover, those platforms offer a 
great opportunity to invest in socially and economically transformative projects in 





144 UNCDF, 2021., op. cit., note 134 
145 Ibid. 
146 Baldeh, A, de la Peña, B., n.d. When microfinance goes digital: opportunities, challenges and dangers for 
microfinance institutions and their clients – Progreso [online]. Microfinanzas BBVA. Available at: 
http://www.fundacionmicrofinanzasbbva.org/revistaprogreso/en/when-microfinance-goes-digital- 
opportunities-challenges-and-dangers-for-microfinance-institutions-and-their-clients/ [last accessed on 1 
March 2021] 
147 Ibid. 
148 Small and Medium Enterprises. (Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018. op. cit., note 75). 
149 Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018. op. cit., note 75. 
150 Crowfunding platforms, 2021. Best P2P Lending Platforms | Peer to Peer Investing. [online]. P2P Lending 
| Crowlending. Available at: https://crowdfunding-platforms.com/ [last accessed on 27 March 2021] 
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There are many examples of peer-to-peer digital platforms, within which have been selected 
the case of Zidisha and Kiva. Zidisha151 is a US micro-lending community, founded by Julia 
Kurnia in 2009, after seeing the high operational costs that borrowers in developing countries 
were experimenting with traditional micro-lenders. It became the first micro-lending service 
to connect lenders and borrowers – which post the projects by themselves - internationally 
without a MFI as intermediary. Lenders can fund borrowers to enable them develop their 
businesses, and whilst repaying the loan, borrowers can share updates about their evolution. 
Indeed, Zidisha has managed to offer the lowest cost for the borrowers to access microloans. 
They are below 10%, and include the service fee of 5% for each loan raised – which serves 
to cover money transfer costs - as well as the interest rates paid out to lenders. In this scenario 
borrowers can retain more profits, making it less probable to end up in a situation of over 
indebtedness. Which is to say, this type of micro-lending can have a more positive impact in 
reducing poverty. And from the lenders’ side, Zidisha has a reserve fund used to compensate 
them in the event one loan is not repaid on time. Until now, Zidisha has managed to lend 
$18.041.184 to fund 268.426 different types of projects in Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria 
and Namibia. 
Kiva152 is a US non-profit crowd-lending platform, founded in 2005 and operating in 80 
countries. In a similar vein like Zidisha, it unlocks capital for all those entrepreneurs in 
developing countries unable to access credit in traditional banks. Projects are posted in the 
website and lenders can scroll and select those which match more with their interests, 
knowing that there is a minimum contribution of only $25 and they will not be charged with 
interest rates. Differently than Zidisha, Kiva operates through field partners (MFIs, schools, 
NGOs, or social enterprises), which help to connect with the borrowers, administer the loans 
on the ground, and cover administrative costs. They are the ones who post the borrowers’ 
businesses profiles on the website, and additionally some of them provide training, financial 
literacy classes or health services. Entrepreneurs repay the loan to the field partners with 
some interests, which are also charged with some interest rates when they send the loan to 
Kiva. A part from that, there is also the figure of the trustee, which vouches for borrowers 
who want to apply for direct loans instead of being administered by field partners. Most of 
those loans receive 0% of interests, and are funded directly to the borrower. Until now, Kiva 
has managed to lent $1.4 billion to 3.5 million borrowers, 85% of them being women. This 
means that 1.810.982 loans have been founded, most of which have gone to support farmers, 
people in conflict zones, and a higher education. 
All those alternative models outline a new reality that has come to stay. They emerge as a 
response of mistrust in traditional international and local economic and political institutions, 
for the way they have been operating in developing countries. Thus, they to try to solve their 
inefficiencies and malpractices when recollecting and delivering financial development aid 
to those most in need. And the way to do so is by directly empowering the citizens, by 
acknowledging that aid effectiveness and progress is only achieved when it is based in 
solidarity redistribution. Each individual has the potential to help many others, and in general 
the potential to change the world. Those alternative models represent a radical new way of 
securing and streamlining the delivery of financial development aid because they have in 
 
151 Zidisha, 2021. Zidisha: Help remarkable people achieve their goals. [online]. Available at: 
https://www.zidisha.org/why-zidisha [last accessed on 1 March 2021] 
152 Kiva, 2021. Where Kiva works | Kiva. [online]. Available at: https://www.kiva.org/about/where-kiva-works 
[last accessed on 1 March 2021] 
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their core the willingness that individuals have to see real changes in the world. To secure 
because intermediaries are reduced and in most cases money is lent directly to borrowers, 
with which lenders can establish a close relationship. And to streamline because every day 
more lenders and borrowers are joining those platforms, and thus more transformative 
projects can be funded. Moreover, they enhance and induce a broader change in the way aid 
has been delivered traditionally, meaning with the following. Firstly, that North-South 
cooperation is no longer seen from a paternalistic unconcerned point of view, but rather from 
a solidarity cooperative point of view. Individuals from both sides get to know each other, 
get to share the preoccupation for the business to succeed, and after all the wish to achieve 
more progress. And secondly, that lenders can be from any part of the world, even from the 
same country, thus it also contributes to enhance South-South cooperation and to reduce 
inequalities within countries. 
However, those alternative models still represent a small complement to the micro-financial 
development aid ecosystem, largely dominated by traditional MFIs. A situation that is 
expected to suffer important changes in the short and medium run after the massive 
introduction of disruptive new technologies, which can add a whole new potential to the way 
financial aid is being managed. This will be examined in the subsequent chapters, which will 
focus firstly on explaining the importance that financial development aid has in meeting the 
UN SDGs, as well as the role that Blockchain can have in achieving so if it is integrated as a 
mainstream technology to improve financial development cooperation. 
 
 
2.4 How do digital technologies applied to financial development aid contribute to 
meeting the UN SDGs? 
 
As we get closer to 2030 the international community seems to have more added difficulties 
to tackle global challenges and meet the UN SDGs. The economic and financial shocks 
associated with COVID-19 have been the last manifestation of many other trends such as the 
declining of ODA to LDCs, and the increasing environmental shocks affecting in major 
proportions developing countries. In this context, sustainable finance becomes more difficult 
and with it the ability to achieve the UN SDGs by 2030. Because of this, in 2020 the Inter- 
Agency Task Force on Financing for Development of the UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs launched a report about Financing for Sustainable Development,153 in which 
it pointed out that in order to arrest this backslide governments, businesses and individuals 
should take action in two directions. Firstly, to “harness digital technologies in support of 
sustainable finance” and secondly to boost the “growing interest in sustainable investment”. 
In regard to the second one, the UN also acknowledges the importance of alternative models 
to financial development aid, which calls as “human-centred finance.” In those it includes 
business leaders taking into consideration sustainability factors to achieve long-term 
financial success, but also individual investors supporting sustainable finance. However, it 
needs to be emphasized that all the voluntary actions which have progressively emerged in 
the recent years in the sustainable finance industry are still insufficient to arrive to the level 
 
 
153 United Nations Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development, 2021., op. cit., note 63, p. xviii 
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of change to achieve the UN SDGs. In this sense, it calls upon policymakers to help transition 
upon sustainable investment.154 
In regard to the first one, digital technologies can have a tremendous impact in financing all 
the UN SDGs, through financial markets, public finance and other financial development 
pathways. Indeed, we already count with a wide range of examples where digital technologies 
have made a difference across all UN SDGs155. They can facilitate more people to access to 
more products and services at a reduced cost, they can enable a more sustainable and resilient 
growth, and ultimately bring more energy efficiency and a decarbonized society.156 In 
particular, in the financial development field digital technologies can bring important benefits 
to the way aid is delivered to the poor and under-served. From the financial sector, it can 
facilitate payments, intermediation and risk management between the lenders and the 
borrowers. And in the public financial management, it can help in tackling corruption and 
leakages, it can enhance transparency, accountability, accessibility and citizen 
participation,157 and to gain more efficient aid deliveries. Indeed, achieving major rates of 
financial inclusion worldwide is one of the greatest benefits digital technologies have brought 
into the financial development system, thanks to the key role that FinTech companies have 
played and will play. Digital technologies are, thus, a corrective measure to traditional 
approaches such as Microfinance, which has proven unable to overcome structural problems 
such as elevated operation costs, lack of financial sustainability and scalability, lack of 
transparency and bad governance, and important information asymmetries158. 
Being really aware of the need to increase financing for development and make the most of 
the period of digital disruption we are living in, in 2018 the UN Secretary General António 
Guterress additionally established the Task Force on Digital Financing of the Sustainable 
Development Goals,159 as part of his broader Roadmap for Financing the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development: 2019-2021. Its main objective was the same drawn by the 2020 
report, being to give recommendations and catalyse ways to harness digitalization in 
accelerating financing of the UN SDGs.160 It departs addressing five core questions, two of 
them being how has the digitalization already contributed to financing progress towards the 
UN SDGs, and what are the digitally enabled opportunities for financing the UN SDGs. As 
a general point, accepts that that digitalization can have a transformative impact by 
empowering people in financing, meeting their own priorities as savers, lenders, borrowers, 
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corruption-measures-in-fighting-.html [last accessed on 4 March 2021] 
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investors and taxpayers. Those priorities are somehow represented by the UN SDGs.161 
Concretely, the Task Force has four goals: 
1. Digital financing becomes an integral part of sustainable development strategies 
2. Digital financing improves alignment of trillions of dollars with the UN SDGs 
3. Pathfinder initiatives advance digitally enabled UN SDG-aligned financing162 
4. Innovative governance harnesses digitalization in financing the UN SDGs 
Among all the key digital technologies the UN refers to Blockchain (or Distributed Ledger 
Technology – DLT) as one that has the potential to drive progress in a lot of different fields 
covered by the UN SDGs163. It can be implemented in the development field to “offer new 
ways to track aid and tackle corruption, facilitate smart-aid contracts and cut costs for 
international payments”164. Regarding financial aspects, it can reduce barriers to market entry 
and facilitate the decentralization of key functions of financial markets, enabling transactions 
to be more transparent, secure and cheap. It notices that Blockchain has enabled the 
emergence of new financial players, as are the peer-to-peer digital platforms. Those are 
progressively disintermediating the financial market, and their vast potential is definitively 
starting to gain attention among national governments, international organisations, venture 
capitalists, the private sector and financial institutions, in general which see those alternative 
financial models as a clear threat to its hegemony165. 
 
 
3. The disruptive potential of Blockchain technologies in 
financial development aid 
 
Before the pandemic of COVID-19 reports estimated that in order to meet the UN SDGs for 
2030 an additional investment of $2.4 trillion a year was needed. The achievement of these 
goals is an objective per se, because it would mean a substantial progress in the overall 
development of the world, especially in developing countries. Moreover, major rates of 
progress are directly transformed in major opportunities to invest in certain markets. Indeed, 
it is estimated that reaching those goals would open $12 trillion of market investment 
opportunities in mainly four sectors: food and agriculture, sustainable cities, energy and 
materials and health and well-being166. However, this promising panorama clashes 
automatically with the current reality of financial development aid, in which recent 
challenges have multiplied whilst financial resources devoted to tackle them – mainly ODA 
- have reduced along with their efficacy. Something that was very much stressed by the UN 
Secretary General António Guteress in the General Assembly High-Level Dialogue on 
 
 
161 UNDP and UNCDF, 2021. Digital financing and the SDGs – DFTF [online]. Available at: 
https://digitalfinancingtaskforce.org/digital-financing-and-the-sdgs/ [last accessed on 7 March 2021] 
162 UNDP and UNCDF, 2021. Pathfinder initiatives – DFTF. [online]. Available at: 
https://digitalfinancingtaskforce.org/pathfinder-initiatives/ [last accessed on 7 March 2021] 
163 Barbara, 2018. Digital technology for the sustainable development goals. [Blog]. Diplo Foundation, 
Available at: https://www.diplomacy.edu/blog/digital-technology-sdgs [last accessed on 9 March 2021] 
164 Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018. op. cit., note 75, p. 37. 
165 United Nations Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development, 2021., op. cit., note 63, p. 26 
166 Ingram, G., Mosbacher Jr, R., 2018, op. cit., note 61 
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Financing for Development in 2019167, in which he said “Financing is the test of our 
seriousness […] without resources, we simply will not deliver for people or planet. […] (The 
world) is not on track to achieve the Goals”. With this he pointed to the fact that we need 
adequate, predictable and sustainable funding, coming both from the public and the private 
sector, flowing to projects in developing countries. Innovative funding mechanisms were put 
on the table, highlighting the role the private sector can play in fulfilling certain financing 
gaps. And besides funding, there is also the structural concern about the lack of efficiency of 
financial development aid, since it continues to reproduce the same logics of power already 
addressed by the Four High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness168 and further by the Global 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation169 (Nairobi, 2016), and the Kampala 
Principles on effective private sector engagement in developing cooperation170 (2019) . This 
means, a lot of countries continue to dis-align their development actions with the accepted 
principles of ownership, predictability and transparency, inclusive partnership, the use of 
indicators to monitor the progress, among others. 
If this was the situation in 2018-2019, with the irruption of the pandemic of COVID-19 the 
lack of funding and efficiency of development aid has become an even major struggle. As 
UNDP estimates171, global human development could fall for the first time since 1999, with 
the triple hit to health, education and income. For example, 44 million people are expected 
to be pushed into extreme poverty by 2030 due to COVID-19. While many challenges have 
worsen, on the other side new opportunities continue to emerge for reaching the Goals, all of 
them requiring a great bunch of new financial investments172. In addition, most of them also 
rely on the multiple benefits that technologies have demonstrated, ultimately seen with the 
pandemic173. Thus, it is highly relevant to explore how new technologies can address socio- 
economic challenges by helping to meet UN SDGs especially in developing countries174. 
“Blockchain technology has been heralded by many as the next big thing, ascertaining that 
in the next two decades it will transform society even more than the internet has transformed 
media”175. Precisely, it falls within the scope of this work to propose how the disruptive 
potential of the Blockchain technology can provide a positive impact in the management and 
delivery of financial development aid. From this point onwards, it will be presented how 
Blockchain can serve as a corrective mechanism to achieve a major impact of microfinance 
 
 
167 United Nations, 2019. Declining Aid, Rising Debt Thwarting World’s Ability to Fund Sustainable 
Development, Speakers Warn at General Assembly High-Level Dialogue. [online]. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12191.doc.htm [last accessed on 10 March 2021] 
168 Roma (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008), Busan (2011). 
169 GPEDC, 2020, op. cit., note 30. 
170 GPEDC, 2019, op. cit., note 39. 
171 UNDP, 2021. COVID-19 and the SDGs | UNDP. [online]. UNDP. Available at: 
https://feature.undp.org/covid-19-and-the-sdgs/ [last accessed on 14 March 2021] 
172 UNDP and Pardee Center for International Futures, 2020. Impact of COVID-19 on the Sustainable 
Development Goals: Pursuing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in a World Reshaped by COVID- 
19. [online]. Available at: https://sdgintegration.undp.org/sites/default/files/Impact_of_COVID- 
19_on_the_SDGs.pdf [last accessed on 15 March 2021] 
173 United Nations Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development, 2021., op. cit., note 63 
174 Zambrano, R., 2017. Blockchain: Unpacking the disruptive potential of blockchain technology for human 
development. [online]. New York: International Development Research Centre, p. 5. Available at: https://idl- 
bnc-idrc.dspacedirect.org/bitstream/handle/10625/56662/IDL-56662.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y [last 
accessed on 18 March 2021] 
175 Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018. op. cit., note 75, p. 37. 
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solutions in developing countries, aimed at fostering financial inclusion in the short run and 
sustainable progress in the long run. As said in the previous chapter, micro-financial 
development aid has in its core the democratization of financial resources, meaning by this 
allowing access to credit and other financial resources to poor people which have traditionally 
remained excluded from financial institutions. This bottom-up inclusive approach has over 
the years conflicted with the overall uncertain results that microfinance has proven to produce 
in a lot of those countries, mainly due to the way in which it has been managed and 
implemented. Basically, power and information asymmetries have persisted between the 
lenders and the borrowers, as well as a lack of transparency and accountability derived from 
a commercialized for-profit governance in most of the cases, that has caused corruption, over- 
indebtedness of the poor and over-profits for the ones at the top of the pyramid. However, as 
the World Bank and other institutions recognized, if microfinance is implemented correctly 
it can really help people to generate economic wealth and progressively reduce the levels of 
poverty in developing countries176. 
In this sense, it is basic to highlight how the Fourth Industrial Revolution, represented by the 
key digital technologies: cloud computing, big data, Artificial Intelligence, Internet of Things 
and Blockchain, can enable different transformative changes that are thought to be key to 
achieve the UN SDGs (see Table 4)177. In this sense, Blockchain emerges as the perfect 
corrective mechanism to enhance microfinance and in general of financial development aid 
because it can help in three man aspects. The first, because it can bring more transparency to 
systems and platforms, transforming the way in which funds are monitored and managed. 
The second, because it allows a more decentralized and sustainable management of the 
resources, favoring aid efficiency and financial inclusivity. The third, because it enables the 
creation of, and access to new financial mechanisms. This is indeed related to increase and 
improve the accessibility to microfinance options, as Blockchain can truly deliver on the 
promise of democratizing investment and access to financial services and information, as 



















176 Smith, S., 2020. Blockchain Promised Democratization of Finance – Collaborating with Microfinance Can 
Make This a Reality. Forbes, [online]. Available at: 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/seansteinsmith/2020/10/07/blockchain-promised-democratization-of-finance-- 
collaborating-with-microfinance-can-make-this-a-reality/?sh=106171b602b3 [last accessed on 15 March 2021] 
177 World Economic Forum and PwC, 2020., op. cit., note 156. 
178 Smith, S., 2020, op. cit., note 177. 
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Table 4: Which goals have the most Fourth Industrial Revolution applications today? 
 
Source: World Economic Forum in collaboration with PwC179 
The relevance for studying how Blockchain can contribute to secure and streamlining the 
delivery of financial development aid corresponds mainly to three aspects. The first, that the 
international community is eager to find new financial mechanisms with which to be able to 
help developing countries to combat poverty, progress and achieve a level of sustainable 
progress. The second, that while countries are decreasing its resources devoted to ODA, the 
role of the private sector – especially Fintech companies along with individual donors – is 
progressively becoming more important, due to its capacity of finding innovative solutions 
that could bring major efficiency gains. And the third, that even though these innovative 
solutions are still dominated by the private industry, their disruptive potential is gaining every 
day more attention from the public sector, as the one having the sufficient legitimacy and 
authority to leader the development cooperation agenda. In this vein, the UNDP already 
stated in its pioneer white paper of 2018 “The future is decentralized”180 that “the 
transformative power of blockchain technology should not be seen as a threat to existing 
systems of governance but rather as an opportunity for national governments and 
international institutions to defend the rights of those they represent and to accelerate our 
collective progress towards meeting the UN SDGs”. And it illustrated how blockchain has 
and can bring new levels of efficiency and effectiveness to the fields of development aid, 
supply chain management, renewable energy, economic growth, among others. Additionally, 
the UN has also created the Blockchain Commission for Sustainable Development181, aimed 
 
 
179 World Economic Forum and PwC, 2020., op. it., note 156. 
180 UNDP, 2018. White paper: The Future is Decentralised. [online]. UNDP. Available at: 
https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/corporate/the-future-is-decentralised.html [last 
accessed on 3 February 2021] 
181 Blockchain Commission for Sustainable Development, 2021. Blockchain Commission for Sustainable 
Development. [online]. Linkedin. Available at: https://www.linkedin.com/company/blockchaincommission/ 
[last accessed on 14 March 2021] 
41 
 
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona Nº 5/2021, 22 DE JUNIO DE 
2021 COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA 
Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
at developing a multi-sectoral framework when utilizing blockchain to develop solutions to 
tackle global challenges. The Commission maintains a multi-stakeholder participation, with 
the presence of the UN, member states, international organizations, private entities and civil 
society. Indeed, afterwards it has launched “Blockchain for Impact” (BFI), a collaborative 
advocacy and action platform designed to serve the growing community with leaderships 
from the global blockchain ecosystem. And the UNDP has partnered with Blockchain, the 
World Economic Forum and other UN agencies and programs to concretely explore 
blockchain uses in relation to development.182 
Analyzing the potential that Blockchain technology can have in the financial development 
aid field means assessing the capacity to effectively tackle human development challenges 
in a better way than other previous mechanisms have been able to183. For this it will discuss 
to what extent can Blockchain improve micro-financial development aid, and then present 
the existing applications of Blockchain and the UN SDGs. However, it also implies to 
acknowledge which are the current constrains that difficult or limit this potential. This will 
be also discussed in this chapter, for example the viability of certain infrastructures and the 
adaptability of regulations both in developed and developing countries. Finally, it will 
conclude with a proposal on how to address the future governance of Blockchain in the 
development field. A debate that somehow has to take into consideration the need to leverage 
what the different actors can bring up to this, meaning by this the balance between who has 
the resources and capacities versus who was the legitimacy and authority to decide and 
implement. A reality that can be managed from the multi-stakeholder approach. 
 
 
3.1 What is blockchain? 
 
Since the middle of the 20th century the world is immersed in what can be understood as the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution184, characterized by a fusion of technologies that is blurring the 
lines between the physical, the digital and biological spheres. This new world’s era cannot 
be compared to the previous ones because it is evolving in an exponential rate, meaning by 
this that the speed and the depth in which changes occur are completely transforming entire 
systems of production, management and governance. Indeed, its scale (velocity), scope and 
complexity (impact) are expected to alter all the spheres of our life. Thus, it can bring positive 
impacts – raising global incomes, improving the quality of life, making the global chains 
more efficient, opening new markets and boosting economic growth -, but also certain 
challenges. – increasing inequalities and social tensions as a result of disrupting labor 
markets, high-sophistication in terms of capital requirements, human capacity and 
institutional environments. It is specifically worrying the situation of developing countries, 
if they want to become active players and not just end-users or consumers of these 
 
 
182 UNDP Europe and Central Asia, 2018. Blockchain research to support Sustainable Development Goals. 
[online]. Available at: 
https://www.eurasia.undp.org/content/rbec/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2018/blockchain-research-to- 
support-sustainable-development-goals.html [last accessed on 9 March 2021] 
183 Zambrano, R., 2017., op. cit., note 175. 
184 Schwab, K., 2016. The Forth Industrial Revolution: what it means, how to respond. [Blog]. World Economic 
Forum, Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it- 
means-and-how-to-respond/ [last accessed on 7 March 2021] 
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technologies185. Enhancing the former whilst minimizing the latter urges a new kind of 
governance able of responding in an integrated manner, only achieved by involving all the 
relevant stakeholders in the matter: the public and private sector, the academia and civil 
society. 
Those technologies do not only refer to the unlimited possibilities that people have with their 
smart phones. But also to other astonishing discoveries such as Artificial Intelligence, the 
Internet of Things, 3-D printing, robotics, quantum computing, nanotechnology, 
biotechnology, among others. 
Blockchain is also included in this scenario as a newer technology, developed by Satoshi 
Nakamoto after publishing the white-paper “Bitcoin: a Peer-to-peer Electronic Cash 
System186” in the 31st of October 2008. This short white-paper gave origin to Bitcoin, by 
formulating the use of digital money (from now on, cryptocurrency) without the need of 
having a third trustee – normally a central bank - when doing electronic transactions 
(decentralized) from one peer to another one. In a context of global financial crisis, people 
lost even more confidence in the global financial system. Thus, Bitcoin emerged as an 
alternative to the global economic system, as a way of fighting against the established power, 
aspiring to become the new global order187. 
Bitcoin was a financial platform, and as such required a mechanism that could substitute the 
task associated to the third-trustee. This was achieved through a digital ledger – which relied 
on the Blockchain technology - to record all the digital transactions among people using 
cryptocurrencies (tokens188 or bitcoins). Thus, Blockchain technology emerged as one of the 
core pillars of Bitcoin, linked mainly to the financial sector. This new Bitcoin software or 
protocol189 (or “genesis block”) was launched the 3th of January 2009 by Nakamoto and Hal 
Finney as an Open Source, and it remains this way. This means that the digital ledger 
recording transactions is public, all the actors190 intervening have real-time and full access to 
data recorded in the database, without requiring authorizations. And it is also distributed and 
decentralized (this is why blockchain can be also called a Decentralized Ledger Technology 
 
 
185Zambrano, R., 2017. op. cit., note 175, p. 17. 
186 Nakamoto, S., 2008. Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. [online]. Bitcoin. Available at: 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [last accessed on 13 March 2021]. 
187 Caballero, M., 2019, Bitcoin. Blockchain y Tokenización para inquietos. 1st ed. Madrid: Bubok Publishing 
S.L., pp. 70-72 
188 A token is a representation of any physical or digital asset. (Ibid, p. 176. See Chapter 25). 
189 Every cryptocurrency has its own protocol, meaning by this its own rules applied to Blockchain. In the case 
of Bitcoin, the dimension of each block is of 1 MegaByte, and every 10 minutes our node (computer) will add 
the block to the chain, accumulating the maximum number of transactions that it can. Satoshi Nakamoto 
designed a maximum limit of tokens (the cryptocurrency of bitcoin) in 21 million. This is one of the greatest 
contributions because having a fix supply of tokens has many advantages in economic terms. It is often called 
a deflationary model. Translation from Spanish to English. (Ibid, p. 78-79). 
190 Bitcoin and every blockchain is composed by three main users that have different objectives. The first are 
the developers, which are the group of programmers maintaining and improving the network’s code and dealing 
with problems regarding the scalability, velocity and security of the network. Their work is approved by the 
nodes. The second are the users, which are the group of people or enterprises using the network to generate 
transactions using tokens. The users are the ones giving value to the network, being able to use tokens as money 
in all its senses. And the third, the miners, are a variation of the nodes’ operators conforming the infrastructure 
that maintains the network. Basically, they are responsible for creating and amplifying the blockchains, 
providing the security and trustworthiness that the network needs to guarantee the veracity of transactions. 
Translation from Spanish to English. (Ibid, p. 74-75) 
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– DLT) , so all the network nodes (computers) store an up-to-date copy of transactions in 
blocks that conform a chain, and thus no single node has complete system information191. In 
this peer-to-peer network (P2P) all the nodes are interconnected, but if one node goes down 
the other ones remain and data and information keeps flowing. The transactions that are 
generated are encrypted with a code (hash) and ultimately saved in blocks, in the form of a 
Merkle tree. In Table 5 we can see how the different transactions, at the bottom of the tree, 
are being grouped until forming one single block – with a unique hash or identifier and a 
unique time stamp that registers the date and time-, that will be added to the chain192, forming 
a blockchain. This technology uses cryptographic tools to bring security along with 
transparency. On the one hand, because it uses a private key only known by its owner and 
used to encrypt the transaction. On the other hand, because the sum of private keys will be 
used for the nodes to create a public key cryptography to be part of the network and to 
publicly identify it. However, no public key can be used to decipher a private key. 
Table 5: The Merkle tree applied to Blockchain and Bitcoin 
 
 
Source: Changelly (2020)193 
The Merkle tree brings efficiency and transparency because it facilitates the task that the 
nodes have in a decentralized network of verifying the transmitted information. Once the 
network nodes have validated the transactions through a reached consensus, the block is 
added to the existing blockchain. In this sense, it is different from traditional financial 
operators or other systems (such as governance mechanisms) using centralized networks 
because in here it is the network itself that provides trust among the peers. Consensus is 
achieved when nodes use their computing power, with the proof of work of an algorithm, and 
other networks validate the information. Moreover, blockchain also brings integrity to the 
data because it is immutable. It is impossible to change or falsify blockchain blocks, and 
 
191 Zipmex, 2020. Distributed VS Decentralized Blockchain Systems. [Blog]. Zipmex, Available at: 
https://zipmex.com/learn/distributed-vs-decentralized/ [last accessed on 12 March 2021] 
192 Zambrano, R., 2017. op. cit., note 175, p. 22 
193 Rousey, M., 2020. Features of using the Merkle tree in blockchain and Bitcoin. [Blog]. Changelly blog, 
Available at: https://changelly.com/blog/merkle-tree-explain/ [last accessed on 17 march 2021] 
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users cannot complete an invalid transaction. Also, anonymity is highly achieved because 
users do not need to provide personal details to be a part of the network, and thus no one can 
make profit about it, as it is the case of social media. 
The great potential of Blockchain beyond the financial sector (with Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies following this first protocol, like Ethereum194) was progressively 
acknowledge in 2014 onwards for many innovators and venture capitalists. The exponential 
growth started in 2016 (see Table 6), being deployed for more countries for a variety of 
purposes, and also for large and traditional financial institutions, which are seeking how to 
use this technology to improve their activities and practices195. However, the current uses of 
blockchain are still focused on private sector services, such as remittances and intellectual 
property rights, but also in the fields of agriculture and food security. Therefore, the interest 
of public administrations and international organizations in the matter is justified by the fact 
that many different services could be largely improved, specially in developing countries. 
For example: land-titles, identity services, anti-corruption mechanisms, electoral processes, 
and aid distribution and development actions (including in here microfinance). 




Source: International Development Research Centre, based on Google Trends (2017) 
Note: Most of the searches are identified in developed countries, whilst the implementation of this technology 






194 Ethereum is the second largest crypto project of the world after Bitcoin, but it pretends to be the biggest 
decentralized computer. Its main differences compared to Bitcoin is that Ethereum has a responsible figure, 
named Vitalik Buterin, and that its nodes can store transactions and execute programs. In 2014, Vitalik and 
others created its own token, an Ether, and in 2015 they launched the first version of the web, the so-called 
genesis block. From this point onwards a wide range of new decentralized applications have emerged around 
Ethereum. Translation from Spanish to English. (Caballero, M., 2019, op. cit., note 188, p. 121-123) 
195 Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018. op. cit., note 75, p. 38; Zambrano, R., 2017. op. cit., note 175, p. 20 
196 Zambrano, R., 2017. op. cit., note 175, p. 20 
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3.2 Elements of Blockchain technology (BT) 
 
Having explained the emergence of the BT and its basic notions and conceptualizations about 
how it works, it is now important to highlight which are the key characteristics that make this 
technology as relevant as it is becoming. Specifically, this section will introduce and describe 
the core principles that can be useful when defending that the BT can serve as a positive tool 
to improve current systems of governance, such as financial development aid. 
To recapitulate, the potential of BTs derives from its three main novelties: The composition 
of the blocks, the consensus mechanism, and the decentralization and openness of the 
ledger197. These novelties bring the following technical benefits198. 
Regarding the composition of the blocks: 
• Privacy and quasi anonymity: since every block is encrypted with a hash (digital code), 
which can be public or private, no personal information can be used by third parties to 
obtain profit. Moreover, users do not need to provide personal details to become a part 
of the network, they can use pseudonyms. 
• Security: the cryptography cannot be broken, thus transactions cannot be manipulated, 
copied nor used to re-spend it again. 
• Rapidity: transactions are completed, registered and validated very rapidly. In Bitcoin 
this time is of 10 minutes, and in Ethereum of 15 seconds199. 
Regarding the consensus mechanism: 
• Immutability and integrity: the information contained in the blocks cannot be changed 
nor falsified unanimously because the transactions can be linked to the user and in order 
to approve them all the other nodes need to validate them. In the same vein, in order to 
change the code or the blockchain operations a majority of the nodes, which are a lot, 
need to reach a consensus on the new direction. This scenario is highly unlikely, as 
well as the probability of hacking the blockchain. 
• Transparency, traceability and auditability: the information about transactions is 
available in real-time to all the nodes, none of them being able to hide or manipulate it. 
This transparency assures the traceability and auditability of all transactions, who have 
sent them and to where. 
• Trust and governance: trust relies in all the nodes that conform and ensure the network 
viability. All of them have, in principle, the same bargaining power and political 
leverage. 
Regarding the decentralization and openness of the ledger: 
• Democratic: the decentralized nature implies that every member of the network holds 
a copy of each electronic transaction. Since there is no central authority, there can be 
no point of failure. Indeed, there can be no censorship because no one can unilaterally 
decide which content to approve or invalidate. Yet each system or protocol is designed 
 
 
197 Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018. op. cit., note 75, p. 38 
198 Ibid, p. 40; Zambrano, R., 2017. op. cit., note 175, p. 30 
199 Caballero, M., 2019, op. cit., note 188, p. 129. 
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with certain rules that are approved or changed by consensus, whilst central banks are 
the main ones deciding how to manage the money. 
• Inclusiveness: the software is public and available, including the cryptographic tools, 
to every user having an equipment of more than 2 GB of RAM and a hard drive of 1 
TB, which most of them have. The limit of growth that the BT has depends on the 
existence of users, miners and nodes maintaining and improving it200. 
• Uncontrollable, non-censurable, unstoppable: since there is no central authority 
validating and controlling the information, no one can unanimously control, censure or 
stop the network. 
• Resilience and reliability: ensured when there is a need to reach consensus for 
verifying, clarifying and transferring assets correctly. 
• Sustainability: the fact that users can obtain economic incentives from participating in 
the network ensures its economic sustainability. 
Apart from this, Blockchain, Bitcoin and in general cryptocurrencies have a smaller 
environmental impact in terms of energy consumption – which mainly comes from 
renewable energies (see page 116 from Caballero, M., 2019) - and yearly cost in 
billions of USD compared to the mining of gold and the banking system, which in 
majority rely on fossil fuels (see Table 8 from Annex 1). This point clearly knocks 
down many arguments and studies claiming exactly the opposite201 
However, it would be naïve to only show the potential benefits that Blockchain can have in 
the mid and long term when in the current context there are still some other characteristics 
that limit its expansion throughout the world. They are not negative per se, but rather 
challenges that policymakers and the international community as a whole should take into 
consideration. They are the following. 
• Complexity: Blockchain technology and cryptocurrency protocols are not really 
comprehensive at the eyes of the majority of the population, specially to many people 
in developing countries, because they use complex technical wording. Thus, the 
challenge if for the public sector along with the private sector to spread the knowledge 
about the crypto world by using a basic and understandable language. 
 
• Centralization: though most of the people with a computer device can participate in 
the network as users, few people can actually do it as miners, which are the ones in 
charge of running the Proof of Work202 algorithms. It is the way it is because miner 
nodes use sophisticated and expensive hardware, and thus only a few (here we refer to 
companies203) do have this power to control the market. This is critique is mainly 
applied to Bitcoin protocol. Thus, the challenge is for the private sector to develop new 
alternatives that could enable more competition and inclusiveness in this field. In this 
 
200 Ibid, p. 84. 
201 Zambrano, R., 2017. op. cit., note 175, p. 31 
202 The Proof of Work algorithm (PoW) is a term used to explain the mathematical process in which miner 
nodes compete to find the header hash (the encrypted code of the final code that will be added to the chain). As 
long as there are more blocks in the chain, the difficulty of finding this hash increases, and as such the 
competition and the computational effort between the miner nodes. (see Caballero, M., 2019, op. cit., note 188, 
p. 116) 
203 Data for Ethereum shows similar patterns. (Ethereum, 2021. Top 25 Miners by Blocks. [online]. Etherscan. 
Available at: https://etherscan.io/stat/miner?range=7&blocktype=blocks [last accessed on 22 March 2021]) 
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regard, there are other two additional protocols that are applied in Ethereum and other 
protocols: the Proof of Stake (PoS) and the Delegated Proof-of-Stake (DPoS). In the 
first the computational effort needed to validate transactions has changed for the 
amount of tokens each user has. So the power of the blockchain is concentrated among 
those of the network who have more tokens. In the second each user can become a 
miner, regardless of their overall participation in the network, but they can also delegate 
their capacity to mine to another node. Those who will end up mining will be the ones 
having more delegated votes204. 
 
 
3.3 To what extent can blockchain improve micro-financial development aid? 
 
Throughout the evolution of microfinance as an anti-poverty tool it has been proved that its 
uncertain results derive from the way it was implemented in developing countries and not for 
its core principles. The objective was to significantly reduce the number of people remaining 
unbanked, by providing them access to loans and grants with which to create their own 
business. The intent to democratize access to financial resources and information was indeed 
a very powerful mechanism regarding development cooperation, because it was not an 
assistance kind of policy, but rather an empowering one. Nevertheless, in many cases it 
resulted in big failures, as people were unable to return the debt and end up even poorer than 
before. The factors explaining this critical situation are, precisely, the ones that could be 
radically improved with the use of public Blockchain technologies through digital platforms. 
The objective of financial development cooperation is to achieve aid effectiveness, which 
translates into the efficacy that capital deployment has in achieving economic or human 
development. Then, if micro-financial development aid did not achieve its purposes was 
because the way in which this money was delivered was inefficient, so to say, did not take 
enough into consideration the context in which it was operating. This was clearly understood 
by the UNDP when it launched the pioneer white paper of 2018 “The future is 
decentralized”205, stating that “a more transparent and auditable system for tracking funds 
was needed to ensure effective programs are better supported. [And that] Just a 3% 
improvement in delivery would free up billions in capital efficiency”. This speaks about the 
need to ensure more security when delivering financial development aid, in the form of funds 
and resources. Moreover, the other part of the equation urges to improve the efficiency of 
this aid, which translates into the need to ensure a more streamlined delivery to all these 
people which have been traditionally marginalized from financial and MFIs, either because 
of their geographic isolation or because of their socio-economic situation. Whatever the 
reason is, in the current reality the relevant actors in the development cooperation field are 
being confronted with a straightforward imperative: to formulate sustainable strategies 
through better service delivery. And here is where public Blockchain technologies emerge as 






204 Caballero, M., 2019, op. cit., note 188, p. 117-118. 
205 UNDP, 2018., op. cit., note 188. 
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In the following table the author has tried to summarize in a comprehensive way the 
comparison between the aspects hindering MFIs and how public Blockchain based digital 
platforms could solve those issues206. 
Table 7: Public Blockchain technologies correcting MFIs limitations 
 
Micro-financial institutions limitations Public Blockchain potentials 
Failure to bring major financial access, in 
the form of “banking the unbanked”. 
Because financial and MFIs do not have the 
capacity to arrive to all the people in need. 
One of its main goals is to increase and 
improve the access and the delivery of 
financial resources, through the use of 
mobiles phones or computer devices, much 
more spread worldwide. Public Blockchains 
are Open Source. → democratizing and 
streamlining the delivery 
The lenders (banks, MFIs or local 
organizations) unilaterally decided who was 
eligible for a credit, following a maximalist 
approach. This meant a lot of authorizations 
without taking into consideration their 
specific needs, their real options of 
succeeding and returning the debt, etc. = 
problem of adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Since only a few were successful in 
developing its business = lower return 
rates, lenders obtaining large profits and 
increasing inequalities between the 
borrowers. This was one of the main 
criticisms imputed to MFIs and banks. 
Decentralized governance, through a P2P 
mechanism, no need for a central authority. 
It is public either on the lender and supply 
side. Profits are lowered and diversified 
through the lenders’ side because there will 
be more competing supply. 
Adverse selection and moral hazard are 
corrected because of the direct and constant 
contact between the lender and the 
borrower, through the digital platform. This 
reduces information asymmetries. Projects 
will be selected based on their capacity to 
succeed, but afterwards it will be possible to 
re-equilibrate lenders’ preferences to 
borrowers’ needs = trust increases on both 
sides, and also the probability of higher 
return rates. 
More sentiment of ownership and 
partnership between people. 
More reputation and confidence on the 
industry. 
High operating costs derived from the task 
of individualizing microcredit options = 
high interest rates of about 50-100% 
charged to borrowers, ending up in a debt 
trap. 
Lenders freely chose the amount of money 
in relation to the borrowers’ needs. 
Competition is introduced on the side of the 
lenders because borrowers can choose 
whether or not to agree on the terms. The 
result is low interest rates of about 10%- 
 
 
206 FinTech Ranking, 2020. What is blockchain doing in microfinance? [Blog]. Available at: 
https://fintechranking.com/2020/02/11/what-is-the-blockchain-doing-in-microfinance/ [last accessed on 21 
March 2021]; Zwitter, A., Boisse-Despiaux, M., “Blockchain for humanitarian action and development aid”, 
Journal of International Humanitarian Action, Vol. 3, 2018, no. 16; UNDP, 2018. op. cit., note 188; Bateman, 
M., op. cit., note 84; Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018. op. cit., note 75; see Annex 1. 
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 12% and, thus, major probabilities of 
business success and higher return rates. 
High administrative costs for the borrowers 
= time lost travelling to the banks, slow 
transaction speeds, additional costs and fees 
for transactions and documentation. 
More time and cost efficient because all the 
operations are done digitally. Through the 
use of Blockchain the cost of processing, 
storing and transferring the information 
decreases exponentially. So, faster and 
higher transactional data can be achieved, 
whilst preserving privacy. People do not 
need to prove their identity and eligibility 
through several documentation. 
Lack of transparency, standardization, 
traceability and accountability of the funds 
and the borrowers = information 
asymmetries between the lender and the 
borrower. Lenders could take advantage of 
borrowers’ vulnerabilities, with a great 
potential for corruption 
Public Blockchain technologies require a 
shared consensus between the nodes to 
approve transactions and add them to the 
block. Transactions are registered and all 
the nodes have a real-time information of 
where the information has gone and for 
what. There is no chance to hide or 
manipulate it, or any other corruption or 
opportunistic behavior. This transparency 
assures the traceability and auditability of 
all transactions, not only in terms of 
assuring the money arrives to both lenders 
and borrowers, but actually to measure the 
effectiveness of the impact that financial aid 
has had. 
More integrity and immutability of the data 
because information cannot be changed nor 
falsified unanimously. This brings 
verifiability to the network → secures the 
delivery. 
Source: Compilation based on the cited resources 
All in all, after this comparison it seems viable that public Blockchain technologies can 
contribute in improving how financial development aid is administered, delivered and used 
by both the sender and the receiver side. Precisely, public Blockchain technologies can be 
well applied in development cooperation as a substitute to banks and MFIs in developing 
countries because they are more useful and disruptive in those places lacking adequate 
infrastructures and trusting operators or intermediaries. “It can make receiving aid easier and 
more dignified”207, not only because it can be tracked but also because it can be matched with 
other financial resources besides microcredit, such as remittances flows and charitable funds. 
Moreover, the capacity to continually assess the impact the aid is having – thanks to the direct 
contact with the receivers - allows organizations, governments and individual lenders to have 




207 UNDP, 2018. op. cit., note 188, p. 10. 
50 
 
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona Nº 5/2021, 22 DE JUNIO DE 
2021 COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA 
Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
grounds if the aid has fulfilled the mandate, if it can be improved and how to do it, and the 
possibilities to scale the action to other places. 
Overall, public Blockchain technologies can provide more tranquility to the financial 
development cooperation system because it actually tackles the main limitations or concerns 
identified in the several High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness (Paris, 2005; Accra, 2008; 
Busan, 2011) and afterwards in the second High-Level Meeting of Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation (Nairobi, 2016). About ownership, it means that 
individuals in developing countries are the ones becoming empowered to launch their own 
projects according to their priorities or their needs, and donors are the ones fitting into this 
reality and not the other way around. This is also linked to alignment and the fact of not 
putting conditions to the aid but rather undertake a constant contact to adapt the donors’ 
preferences to the borrowers’ needs. This change of paradigm from the bottom to the top 
changes the traditional logic of development and aid completely. Public blockchain 
technologies can also contribute to harmonization and results-oriented actions, in the sense 
that projects and programs could be easily tracked and information about the impact could 
be shared faster to other lenders or development organizations. Indeed, communication about 
the everyday progress and results would be flowing constantly from both sides. And this, at 
the same time, linked with mutual accountability and transparency about the shared 
responsibilities and commitments regarding the money and the project behind it. Finally, this 
alternative proposal is also oriented at improving capacity development, by investing in 
transformative actions and projects with a mid and long term timeline. If people succeed in 
their businesses, they will generate more income, their level of consumption will increase, 
more jobs will be created and ultimately poverty rates will decrease and local economy will 
boost and become more resilience. And definitively public Blockchain governance goes 
hand-in-hand with enhancing inclusive partnerships among the public and private sector, 
foundations and civil society. Every actor with their own capacity and resources can help this 
technology to roll out its full disruptive potential. 
In addition, the incorporation of public Blockchain technologies to the financial development 
sector, specially through the use of open digital platforms, can have a major impact in 
favoring the UN SDG nº 17, which calls to strengthen the means of implementation and 
revitalize the global partnerships for sustainable development208. Indeed, target 17.3 is 
devoted to “mobilizing additional financial resources for developing countries from multiple 
sources”, and target 17.6 to “enhance North-South and South-South and triangular regional 
and international cooperation […] through a global technology facilitation mechanism”. 
Those targets, among others, are directly connected with the objectives that Blockchain 
technologies are pursuing. And specially if we take into consideration how the scenario has 
changed with the pandemic of COVID-19. The UN at the end of 2020 stressed that global 
foreign direct investment (FDI) was expected to decline by up to 40% along with remittances 
to low and middle income countries. Therefore, public Blockchain technologies through the 
use of digital technologies can unlock big flows of capital to developing countries, because 





208 United Nations, 2021. Goal 17 | Department of Economic and Social Affairs. [online]. Available at: 
https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal17 [last accessed on 22 March 2021]. 
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3.4 Blockchain microfinancing applications and the UN SDGs 
 
In its white-paper “The future is Decentralized” from 2018 the UNDP traced a direct link 
between the role of public Blockchain technologies and the UN SDGs. It declared the 
following: 
“SDGs will require experimentation and innovation, leverage ‘whole of government’ approaches that 
cut across silos, bring about shared understanding of interlinkages and trade-offs between the various 
goals, and highlight major leverage points for interventions. We also believe that block chain 
technology can accelerate and amplify our efforts because it is relatively quick to develop and 
relatively easy to adapt to such a wide range of tasks209”. 
To justify it, the paper addressed how this technology can contribute in meeting broad 
objectives covered by the UN SDGs to eliminate poverty, protect the environment and 
promote equitable economic development. By explaining how useful can it be for all the 
actors in the field (governments, policymakers, private enterprises and civil society) to 
establish trust, tackle corruption and distribute resources. Therefore, presenting its disruptive 
potential to tackle many pitfalls regarding aid-effectiveness, firstly from a theoretical 
perspective and secondly by supporting it with positive experimental projects around the 
world. This last part will be presented throughout the chapter. 
As the first point, it shows how Blockchain can improve the way in which subsidies or micro- 
financial aid is administered and delivered, thanks to the verifiability, resilience and 
transparency of the system. Thanks to it actors operating in developing countries can have 
the necessary data infrastructure to know about the programs’ efficiencies, to identify 
misconducts or possible corruption, and with it elaborate better projects to be scaled 
somewhere else. Indeed, Blockchain technologies operating through digital platforms 
eliminate the need for intermediaries, which in turn would shorten the process to access this 
credit or subsidy as well as the possibilities for fraudulent operations when collecting and 
verifying the data. 
As the second point, it shows how important establishing verified identities is for 
development action to be effective. From accessing financial services, managing property 
rights, promoting good health and quality education, and others, people need to have control 
over its identity, through secure platforms. Though this might seem a bit odd to someone, in 
2017 the World Bank estimated over 1.5 billion people in the world which still could not 
prove their identity. Thus, this people become invisible in a lot of senses, since, for example, 
they cannot be eligible for subsidies or external payments. In this sense, public Blockchain 
technologies can be of great help for agencies and partnerships operating in the field because 
it can allow them to issue secure, immutable and verified digital identities to all the people. 
Then, more people would be eligible to obtain financial development aid. This would enable 
those actors to plan their actions more accurately. The potential of public  blockchain 
platforms is that its neutrality permits it to be mutually shared among many actors, so 
collaborations and data transfers could be easily done. Consequently, aid results would be 
more effective and efficient. 
As the third point, it shows how important remittances are for economies in developing 
countries, specially in alleviating many households from poverty. Again, the World Bank 
 
209 UNDP, 2018. op. cit., note 188, p. 8. 
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estimated in 2017 that remittances amounted to $444 billion, representing three times more 
than global ODA, and accounting for at least 3% of the GDP in 60 developing countries. 
However, the financial structure to transfer this money is profoundly old an inefficient. 
Transactions are in many cases slow and expensive, due to high fees, and yet many people 
who receive this aid are also unbanked or remotely isolated. In this situation, public 
Blockchain technologies have proven to be a great solution to large segments of populations 
remaining unbanked. Digital wallets and cryptocurrencies are opened and not very expensive 
(you only need a mobile phone or computer device). They do not rely upon intermediaries 
nor hold big infrastructures, reducing quasi totally the time and the costs of making and 
receiving transactions. Moreover, major transparency and less corruption would be achieved 
since both sides would be clearly identified and the funds could be traced in real time. Indeed, 
Blockchain wallets continue to increase year by year, with more than 68 million users in 
February 2021210, being used a lot of them for cross-border transactions. 
Other points show the benefits Blockchain technologies can bring in improving supply chain 
management (related to UN SDG nº 12: “Responsible consumption and production”), access 
to affordable and clean energy (related to UN SDG nº 7), and the exercise of property rights 
(related to UN SDGs nº5: “Gender equality”, nº 10: “Reducing inequalities” and nº 16: 
“Peace, justice and strong institutions”). 
More recently, the World Economic Forum in collaboration with PwC published in January 
2020 a paper entitled “Unlocking technology for the Global Goals”211, in which they stated 
technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution could have a high impact across 10 of the 
17 UN SDGs, with Blockchain playing an important role in 25% of the mapped applications 
(see Table 4). However, the impact was not equally distributed among all the goals, as the 
paper shows a great correlation between the private-sector markets and the most matured 
goals. In this sense, whilst UN SDG nº 3 (“Good health and well-being”), nº 7, nº 9 
(“Industry, innovation and infrastructure”) and nº 11 (“Sustainable cities and communities”) 
have been highly prone to large investments from big companies, other UN SDGs related to 
market failures (nº 1: “No poverty” and nº 5: “Gender equality”) or the public good (nº 14: 
“Life below water” and nº 15: “Life on land”) have not received very much attention. But 
this assumption does not apply to the same extent to all the technologies. To our interest, the 
paper acknowledges that Blockchain technologies in particular have a high maturity of 
implementation in UN SDGs nº 1 and nº 7. Regarding the first, it highlights the importance 
that Blockchain-enabled crowd-finance for development projects and charitable 
organizations have when combating poverty in developing countries. Moreover, it reassures 
and complements the information explained previously, by declaring a high maturity of 
public Blockchain technologies implementation in land-registry platforms, community- 
distributed market places and peer-to-peer trading, digital identity solutions, among others. 
And regarding UN SDG nº 7, it ascertains a high maturity of Blockchain implementation in 
alternative energy asset financing mechanisms (e.g Blockchain finance platforms and mobile 
money) and a medium maturity in Blockchain platforms to crowd-finance clean energy 
infrastructure development. Both examples serve to totally verify the assumption of this 
 
210 Finances online, 2021. Number of Blockchain Wallet Users 2021/2022: Breakdowns, Timelines, and 
Predictions [online]. Financesonline.com. Available at: https://financesonline.com/number-of-blockchain- 
wallet-users/#:~:text=As%20such%2C%20the%20number%20of,Blockchain.com%2C%202021)%20 [last 
accessed on 24 March 2021] 
211 World Economic Forum and PwC, 2020, op. cit, note 156. 
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work. Precisely, that public Blockchain technologies can serve as a corrective mechanism to 
secure and streamline the delivery of financial development aid, overcoming limitations 
experienced through the MFIs models. In addition, the potential of Blockchain could be also 
applied to the use of funds in the humanitarian sector, e.g with smart contracts to automatize 
funding already forecasted and thus avoid political interferences and biases212. 
 
 
3.4.1 The state of the art 
 
Having a general picture of the potential applications that public Blockchain technologies 
can have in the field of micro-financial development aid allows us to acknowledge that it is 
still considered as a new and emerging technology. Most of the discussions about its impacts 
and contributions to society are happening at the theoretical level, whilst it is estimated that 
more than 1.000 different small-scale projects have been launched around the world with 
specific objectives and a short timeframe. Thanks to those, the international community is 
progressively considering which are the current technical, social and political obstacles 
which impede those technologies from being introduced into society, and which are the best 
ways through which to overcome such limitations213. As it has been the case with other 
technologies in the past, to ensure Blockchain’s full implementation in the mid and short run 
relevant actors in the field must take into consideration and calibrate how is power and 
leverage distributed in the present political economical context. In other words, to distinguish 
the different types of governors participating in the process of global governance of public 
Blockchain technologies. 
In this direction, the evolution of technologies has been lead and influenced by big 
technological companies from the private sector, which have set themselves up as epistemic 
and moral authorities. They have provided material capabilities, expertise and executive 
abilities, but they have also introduced new ethical or moral values with the intention to 
influence – and in most cases improve – the governance of social, political and economic 
spheres. Public Blockchain technologies are no exception to this trend, and this is the reason 
why in the present scenario we can find a clear hegemony and predominance of applications 
coming from the private sector companies and private aid organisations, also in the financial 
development field214. Regardless of the specific purpose those applications try to improve, 
what they all have in common is their willingness to transition from centralised institutions 
towards more decentralised networks, in which individuals become more empowered 
without denying the role national and international institutions have to play215. Thus, 
institutional authorities are also questioned to position themselves and engage in the 
development of this technology216, contributing with their major legitimacy to set the agenda, 
formulate sustainable policies and introduce monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. 
Something that many governments and international organizations like the UN are starting 
 
 
212 Zwitter, A., Boisse-Despiaux, M., 2018, op. cit., note 207, p. 6. 
213 United Nations, 2021. Blockchain and Sustainable Growth | United Nations. [online] United Nations. 
Available at: https://www.un.org/en/un-chronicle/blockchain-and-sustainable-growth [last accessed on 26 
March 2021] 
214 Based on extensive research about the current Blockchain applications in the financial development field. 
215 UNDP, 2018. op. cit., note 188, p. 34. 
216 United Nations, 2021., op. cit., note 214. 
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to do in the wake of UN SDGs and other international set standards, for example with the 
Secretary-General’s Strategy on New Technologies217. Indeed, this strategy is summarised 
with five guiding principles, four of which address the need to work upon inclusive 
partnerships between the public (governments and organisations) and the private sector 
(businesses, civil society, academia) to achieve long-lasting results regarding the 
implementation of these new technologies (artificial intelligence, Blockchain, biotechnology 
and robotics). 
In the following two parts of this third chapter the work will undertake an analytical revision 
about a selection of different types of public Blockchain applications that both the private 
and public sector are trying to implement in the financial development field, pointing at its 
main differences and contributions to society. It will be seen that in many cases those 
applications rely on the collaboration of both actors. 
 
 
3.4.2. Private companies and aid agencies: the leading voice 
 
Private companies and aid agencies have had a leading voice when incorporating 
technologies as means to innovate in the financial development field. Previously in this work 
it has been showed the emergence of digital platforms during the 2000s decade as a response 
to critical voices complaining about the real effects micro-financial development aid was 
having in many countries. Pioneer examples like Kiva in 2005 as a non-profit crowd-lending 
platform, and Zidisha in 2009 as a micro-lending company have served as a point of departure 
of the following initiatives that have appeared afterwards. Currently, we can identify different 
digital platforms of impact investing and solidary crowd-lending which are based not only 
on the profitability investors can obtain but also on the positive impact the investment can 
have in the receiving society and the environment218. In the same vein, we are seeing a 
growing interest for what has come to be understood as “crypto-economic philanthropy”, 
which basically means philanthropy organizations and individual donors making 
cryptocurrency donations through blockchain-based platforms219. Thus, the innovation relies, 
on the one hand, on the fact that those platforms have proliferated and diversified into 
different types of models targeting different types of receivers. And, on the other hand, that 
progressively more of them are incorporating Blockchain technologies and cryptocurrencies 








217 UN Secretary General, 2018. UN Secretary-General’s Strategy on new technologies. [online]. New York: 
United Nations. Available at: https://www.un.org/en/newtechnologies/images/pdf/SGs-Strategy-on-New- 
Technologies.pdf [last accessed on 23 March 2021]. 
218 Todo Crowlending, 2021. Comparativa Plataformas Crowdlending P2P – El Comparador P2P Definitivo 
2021. [online]. Available at: https://todocrowdlending.com/comparativa-crowdlending/ 
219 Greenfield, R., 2020. 9 Blockchain for Social Impact Predictions for 2020. [Blog]. Robert Greenfield IV, 
Available at: https://robertgreenfieldiv.medium.com/9-blockchain-for-social-impact-predictions-for-2020- 
7e10fbffe0c1 [last accessed on 27 March 2021]. 
220 Due to a limited extension, this work has had to selected a representation of recognised platforms. 
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Philanthropic platforms using Blockchain: 
1) Blockchain Charity Foundation221 (Binance): It is a non-profit organization initiated by 
Binance222, following a transparent and secure philanthropy for the social good. It is the 
first that has adopted blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies, thanks to which donors 
can actually see how their contributions are making changes when combating poverty and 
inequality and seeking sustainable progress throughout the world. There are no 
intermediaries between donors and beneficiaries, and all transactions are recorded. 
Basically, it helps people with no smart phones – especially in Africa - to own crypto 
wallets to receive and transfer cryptocurrencies that can serve as alternative money to 
protect their properties. Again, reaching to people who have been traditionally excluded 
from formal social and financial services. The platform became more important since July 
2018 when it partnered with UNDP, to support the application of blockchain technology 
to provide innovative solutions to development challenges, with a special focus in the 
Asia-Pacific Region223. Afterwards, BCF has also partnered with other governments and 
global institutions, becoming the predominant platform in the field224. 
 
2) BitGive Foundation225: It is a non-profit organization founded in 2013 using Bitcoin and 
Blockchain technology for practical applications for nonprofits and humanitarian work in 
developing countries. It provides transparency and accountability to donors, sharing the 
information and the projects in real-time. The platform has progressively become more 
important, partnering with international NGOs such as Save the Children, or Code to 
inspire226, a tech non-profit training program using technology education as an action to 
fight inequality of Afghan women. 
Crowd-lending or impact investing platforms: 
1) EthicHub227: Spanish collaborative financing platform, connecting small farmers – coffee 
producers - from Mexico with the financing needed to work their land’s productivity and 
sell their crops in a more equitable supply chain. The intention is to generate a new 
ecosystem in which all stakeholders (donors and recipients) win mutual relationships and 
collaboration, to generate a self-funded and robust local market, as well as socioeconomic 
and environmental impact in those small communities and the same personal development 
of individuals. Donors also have the opportunity of buying the coffee from the farmers, 
 
221 Binance Charity, 2020. A revolutionary Donation Platform. [online]. Binance Charity. Available at: 
https://www.binance.charity/ [last accessed on 26 March 2021] 
222 A blockchain ecosystem and the largest cryptocurrency exchange by trading volume 
223 UNDP Asia and the Pacific, 2018. Blockchain Charity Foundation and the UNDP announce partnership to 
explore blockchain for social good. [online]. Available at: https://www.asia- 
pacific.undp.org/content/rbap/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2018/blockchain-charity-foundation-and- 
undp-announce-partnership-to-e.html [last accessed on 15 March 2021] 
224 Binance, 2018. BCF: Blockchain for Social Good. [Blog] Medium, Available at: 
https://medium.com/binanceexchange/bcf-blockchain-for-social-good-8c24164400d5 [last accessed on 20 
March 2021] 
225 BitGive, n.d. About us – BitGive Foundation. [online]. BitGive Foundation. Available at: 
https://www.bitgivefoundation.org/about-us/ [last accessed on 20 March 2021] 
226 Code to inspire, 2021. Building Afghanistan 2.0 with #AfghanGirlsCode We are the first coding school for 
Women in Afghanistan. [online] Code to inspire. Available at: https://www.codetoinspire.org/ [last accessed on 
25 March 2021] 
227 EthicHub, 2021. What is EthicHub?. [online]. EthicHub. Available at: https://www.ethichub.com/en/what- 
is-it-and-how-does-it-work [last accessed on 25 March 2021] 
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and thus establishing even a close relationship between them. The platform is directly 
compromised in meeting 9 UN SDGs228, and has received numerous national and 
international recognitions. It uses a blockchain technology connected to Ethereum’s 
public network called xDai, and the same token to finance the loans and pay the 
correspondent costs. Donors can invest a minimum of 20€, and will be returned the cost 
of the loan plus the interest rate charged to borrowers, which is abot 8%. 
 
2) Microwd229: Spanish micro-credit NGO focused at helping women entrepreneurs in 56 
communities of Nicaragua, Peru and Mexico, as they show lower risk of default and more 
potential for social impact. Donors can invest their money in businesses from ten different 
sectors, and help women get out of poverty. The minimum investment is of about 100€, 
and the interest rate charged to borrowers of about 25%. The platform operates in fiduciary 
money. There is an intermediary operating in the field, ensuring borrowers comply with 
their responsibilities. The platform is directly compromised in meeting 8 UN SDGs230. 
 
3) Lendahand231: Crowdfunding platform based in the Netherlands serving the gap between 
entrepreneurs in emerging markets and available funding to develop. Since most of these 
people cannot access traditional financial institutions, the investment of donors can help 
fight poverty, by stimulating local economies and providing for more local opportunities. 
More than 2.824 different projects have been funded in developing countries. The 
minimum investment is of about 50€, and the interest rates are higher or lower (between 
3%-4%-5%) depending if it is a direct investment or an investment via local partner. The 
platform operates in fiduciary money. It has been repeatedly awarded for its positive 
impact on societies and environment. 
Bigtech companies working in the field 
Maintaining P2P platforms as the framework, many large technological companies by their 
own also use Blockchain technologies to help overcome some limitations related to micro- 
financial development aid, as explained previously. This is the case of Aid:Tech232, an Irish- 
based company working in bringing social and financial inclusion to undocumented and 
unbanked people in developing countries, by delivering them digital entitlements through 
digital platforms using blockchain based-digital identities. This enables organisations using 
the platform to do fast and instant peer-to-peer disbursements to beneficiaries through their 
digital wallets, whilst reducing administrative and operating costs, maintaining transparency 
and traceability, and avoiding corruption or mismanagement of the aid. This was to avoid 
many inconveniencies happening with paper-based vouchers that development agencies 
administered in the field for people to buy goods. In this sense, these new electronic vouchers 
are encrypted with QR codes that contain the person’s identity when buying products, 
therefore there is no need of using a banking system. When this person would be in need of 
more money, the P2P platform would deliver it, without the need of generating another QR. 
 
228 Concretely: nº 1-2-7-8-9-10-12-15-17 
229 Microwd, 2021. Trusting one another is better than not trusting. [online] Microwd. Available at: 
https://www.microwd.es/en/ [last accessed on 25 March 2021] 
230 Concretely: nº 1-2-3-4-5-8-10-17 
231 Lendahand, 2021. Crowdfunding a better world one investment at a time. [online]. Lendahand. Available 
at: https://www.lendahand.com/en-EU [last accessed on 25 March 2021] 
232 AidTech, 2021. Disbursements via Digital ID. [online]. Aid:Tech. Available at: https://www.aid.technology/ 
[last accessed on 25 March 2021] 
57 
 
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona Nº 5/2021, 22 DE JUNIO DE 
2021 COLECCIÓN TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA 
Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES 
 
The system secured and streamlined the delivery of financial development aid. It helped to 
combat fraud and monitor vouchers transactions in real time (always preserving its privacy), 
allowing aid agencies to have extensive reliable data with which to measure the impact of 
the services and the possibility of scaling it. Indeed, this project was first implemented in 
December 2015 between Aid:Tech, the Irish Red Cross and Lebanese humanitarian experts 
with Syrian war refugees in northern Lebanon. It was the first time that international aid was 
delivered completely transparent using public Blockchain technologies. The success of the 
project allowed the company to introduce additional services in the electronic voucher like 
micro-insurance, remittances, social and welfare services like healthcare and micro-pensions, 
etc233. 
International and national aid agencies 
In the private sector we cannot underestimate the important role that international and 
national NGOs play in tackling humanitarian and development challenges in the field. 
Usually they are the ones in the frontline having to cope with the vast array of development 
aid limitations that have been exposed throughout this work. In such a vein, in 2010 Start 
Network234 was created, as a British consortium of 55 international and national NGOs using 
Blockchain technology to ensure a transparent and effective management of public funds 
delivered to people affected by crises. They wanted to radically change systemic problems 
like slow and reactive funding and centralised decision-making, in three different ways: 1) 
Transforming the humanitarian financing model from reactive to proactive, 2) A more 
balanced and inclusive decision-making process with those who work in the field (bottom- 
up approach), 3) Facilitating collective innovation to solve humanitarian challenges. The use 
of Blockchain technologies has enabled a fastest, transparent and traceable distribution of 
financial aid. It started in 2016 thanks to a grant of the government of Estonia, a leading 
country in the implementation of this technology. Start Network partnered with the platform 
Disberse to test blockchain in small disbursements from donors to NGOs and then from 
NGOs to country teams using digital wallets. Since 2010 they have partnered with 7.000 
other actors in 200 countries and territories. The network offers financial infrastructure that 
brings effective and efficient and predictable funding to support populations. 
 
3.4.3. United Nations agencies: in an experimental stage 
 
Since 2018 Blockchain technologies have been progressively introduced in the organization, 
as a tool that can facilitate and democratize its work, especially in the development aid and 
humanitarian sector. Many theoretical discussions have taken place about the disruptive 
potential of Blockchain in meeting the UN SDGs, precisely in a context in which the 
organization has decreased its worldwide reputation as a result of failing to deliver positive 
impacts, as well as the high rates of UN development assistance aid lost to corruption235. 
 
233 UNDP, 2018., op. cit., note 181, p. 15 
234 Start Network, 2021. A new era of humanitarian action. [online]. Start Network. Available at: 
https://startnetwork.org/about-us [last accessed on 25 March] 
235 Pollock, D., 2020. Blockchain For Good: How The United Nations is Looking to Leverage Technology. 
[online]. Forbes, Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrynpollock/2020/02/27/blockchain-for-good- 
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Probably, the international meeting that has been especially important at the UN-level was 
the full-day session “Blockchains for Sustainable Development”, at the 2018 World 
Investment Forum, held at the UN Headquarters in Geneva. As a multi-stakeholder debate, 
governments, companies and civil society discussed about the practical applications of 
Blockchain technologies, the opportunities and challenges in meeting the UN SDGs, and 
finally about policy and regulatory risks and opportunities for governments. Indeed, it was a 
good opportunity for the whole UN system to engage in the use of Blockchain. This was 
already pointed out in 2017 for Yoshiyuki Yamamoto, the former Special Advisor for UN 
Engagement and Blockchain Technology at UNOPS236, which declared how the technology 
could revolutionize aid distribution. 
After it, some agencies and programs started to implement the technology in small scale 
projects in concrete countries, basically applied to improve the efficiency and efficacy of 
development aid. Some of those projects aimed at engaging inter-agency collaborations, and 
others were in conjunction with the private sector. All of those are captured by the UN 
Innovation Network Blockchain Group237, formed by UN employees and other non-UN as 
observers. The Network provides a wide range of different tools to spread the knowledge of 
Blockchain across the UN entities, like the Practical Guide238, the Introduction to Blockchain 
course, the Blockchain Learning Group, the Cryptocurrency Working Group and the Atrium, 
which is an inter-agency platform and decentralized collaboration tool that allows UN entities 
to learn and experiment with the Blockchain technology. This way collaborations are 
enhanced, duplications of work are reduced, and potential of impact is maximized. The 
Atrium uses a private Ethereum Blockchain as the test network, which allows all entities to 
assess their applications and run the nodes. 
Two years later the results have been sufficiently positive to explore the disruptive potential 
of Blockchain applications in the wide development aid field. For example, with cash and 
remittance transfers, supply chain tracking, record keeping, digital identity, increasing 
transparency and tracking of aid funds, etc. However, the technology is still far away from 
its maturity and full incorporation at the UN-level. During this new decade and the following 
it is being expected to reach major long-lasting impacts to many developing countries through 
large scale projects and initiatives239. Some of those experimental projects related to financial 
development aid are the following. 
1) “Building Blocks”, WFP and the UNHCR240: The WFP is the largest humanitarian 
agency delivering cash to people victims of conflict, poverty or under situations of 
under-development. With the intention of improving this aid, in 2018-2019 the agency 
launched this pilot project in which Blockchain technology was used to deliver cash 
assistance more efficiently to 106.000 Syrian refugees living in refugee camps in Jordan. 
 
236 Yamamoto, Y., 2017. Could bitcoin technology revolutionize aid distribution? [online]. UNOPS. Available 
at: https://www.unops.org/news-and-stories/insights/could-bitcoin-technology-revolutionize-aid-distribution 
[last accessed on 2 March 2021] 
237 UN Innovation Network, 2021. Blockchain. [online]. UN Innovation Network. Available at: 
https://www.uninnovation.network/blockchain [last accessed on 10 March 2021] 
238 UN Innovation Network, n.d. A Practical Guide to Using Blockchain within the United Nations. [PDF]. UN 
Innovation Network. Available at: https://atrium.network/guide [last accessed on 10 March 2021] 
239 See Annex 1; Pollock, D., 2020., op. cit., note 236 
240 World Food Programme, 2021. Building Blocks. [online]. World Food Programme. Available at: 
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Differently than Aid:Tech project explained before, the WFP used digital biometric 
registration data from the UNHCR. The scan of their eyes was authenticated and 
recorded on a private Blockchain, establishing by this their identity whilst preserving 
privacy. This scan is the method served to authenticate when wanting to purchase 
something in local markets, as funds are linked to digital identities. This way WFP has 
a transparent traceable record of every transaction, optimizing financial resources and 
preserving security and privacy for refugees. The success of this initiative has resulted 
in exploring how the digital platform can support wider unrestricted cash distributions 
inside the refugee camp. In addition, the project will partnet with UN Women’s Cash for 
Work Program to allow Syrian women in those refugee camps to withdraw cash or make 
direct purchases. 
 
2) “Blockchain for Remittances”, UNCDF241: Nepal is heavily dependent on its citizens’ 
remittances, and they play an important role in the country’s growth and development. 
However, the financial services available on both sides (migrant workers and recipients) 
were not suitable for their specific realities, causing inefficiencies and information 
asymmetries with the traditional banking system. In this sense, in 2019 the UNCDF 
partnered with Laxmi Bank (a commercial bank in Nepal) and New Street Tech (a 
Blockchain private company in India and the Middle East), to explore the use of 
Blockchain technology to improve the delivery of financial services in the excluded 
population from Nepal. 
Similar projects have been launched by other UN agencies and the private sector242 in 
Tajikistan (between Bitspark and Atfinlab – an internal start-up created by the UNDP) 
and Serbia (between Aid:Tech and UNDP), both countries deeply relying on remittances 
and with many population still remaining unbanked. 
3) “Credit Bureau for the Future”, UNCDF and UNDP243: In 2018 a new partnership 
between the Government of Sierra Leone, UNCDF, UNDP and the non-profit digital 
technology platform Kiva, was created to provide the citizens with adequate access to 
financial services, since most of them remained unbanked. The innovation of the project 
was based on the creation of a national digital identification system using Blockchain 
technologies, through which to control your personal information and access financial 
services. The initiative wanted to end up building an advanced national secured credit 
bureau, and had the potential to transform the situation of financial inclusion in the 
country. Moreover, if the model reveals as successful it could be exported to other 
developing and developed countries. 
 
4)  “UNICEF Crypto Fund”, UNICEF: In 2019 UNICEF created its Crypto Fund project 
with the aim of accepting cryptocurrency donations (bitcoin and ether) to finance start- 
up public blockchain projects aiming at improving the situation of vulnerable children 
 
241 UNCDF, 2019. Blockchain for Financial Inclusion in Nepal. [online]. UNCDF- Available at: 
https://www.uncdf.org/article/4513/blockchain-for-financial-inclusion-in-nepal [last accessed on 27 March 
2021] 
242 UNDP, n.d. Beyond bitcoin: Using blockchain to advance the SDGs. [online]. Available at: 
https://feature.undp.org/beyond-bitcoin/#group-5-things-blockchain-can-do-for-the-sdgs-CWDXIGEkKN 
[last accessed on 3 February 2021]. 
243 UNCDF, 2018. Kiva, Sierra Leone and United Nations Agency Partner to Implement “Credit bureau of the 
Future”. [online]. UNCDF. Available at: https://www.uncdf.org/article/3948/kiva-sierra-leone-and-united- 
nations-agencies-partner-to-implement-credit-bureau-of-the-future [last accessed on 28 March 2021] 
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in emerging and developing countries. For it, it partnered with Ethereum Foundation, in 
charge of providing the technical assistance. It is the first initiative of this type in the 
UN, and at the end of 2020 it made 12 investments in public goods across eight countries. 
The importance of introducing this initiative at this high level lies in the fact that donors, 
recipients and society as a whole can track where the funds go, and transactions can be 
made rapidly. This way, reducing inefficiencies and bringing total transparency. A 
precedent that is expected to be followed by other UN agencies and governmental 
organizations in the short future244. 
In addition, it is appropriate to mention that Blockchain technologies can be developed in the 
financial development field because it also exists what is understood as Decentralized 
Finance (DeFi). It is the concept to explain the ecosystem in which financial services are 
available on a public Blockchain network, this is, everyone can access them without having 
to rely on a third authority like a bank. As said, it removes intermediaries between buyers 
and sellers and lenders and borrowers. In order to function it needs stable-coins, such as 
cryptocurrencies, financial services like lending and exchanging, and smart-contracts to 
provide the framework (conditions) for linking both parties in a transaction. We have seen 
that nowadays DeFi and the different technologies and platforms applied are still an emerging 
sector with an infinite potential to be developed. Indeed, it is expected to radically transform 
the financial system, and thus financial development aid245. One concrete example is Alice246, 
a totally decentralized and transparent platform for investors, governments and NGOs using 
financial services for social good. 
 
 
3.5 Current limitations regarding the implementation of Blockchain technologies 
 
The implementation of Blockchain technologies and Decentralized Finance as a whole is still 
in an incipient phase at the international level, with many challenges remaining if it aspires 
to achieve radical transformations in many areas of our live. Due to its nature, if we only 
focus on the financial development field we must include in this discussion the current 
disparities that exist between developed and developing countries that ultimately prevent 
these technologies to pursue its disruptive potential. Moreover, since this work tries to 
propose a broader and multi-stakeholder approach when addressing governance issues, it is 
also necessary to address how these disparities and broader challenges in general could be 
overcome in the future. Somewhat that imperatively encompasses the public and private 
sector to agree upon certain structural aspects. 
In this vein, the first concern that has been raised by many public authors but also 
acknowledged by some in the private sector247 is that the wide spread of technologies can 
end up reproducing situations of inequality and power asymmetries between countries and 
 
 
244 UNICEF, 2020. The UNICEF CryptoFund. [online]. UNICEF. Available at: 
https://www.unicef.org/innovation/stories/unicef-cryptofund [last accessed on 30 March] 
245 Sharma, R., 2021. Decentralized finance (Defi) Definition and Use Cases. [online]. Investopedia. Available 
at: https://www.investopedia.com/decentralized-finance-defi-5113835 [last accessed on 28 March 2021]. 
246 Alice, 2021. The future of impact finance. [online]. Alice. Available at: https://alice.si/ [last accessed on 29 
March 2021]. 
247 See Annex 1. 
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peoples. Mainly, between the providers of intellectual and physical capital248 (which can be 
innovators, shareholders, and donors in this case), located generally in developed countries, 
and the receivers depending on the capital, which in this case are vulnerable, usually low- 
skilled or illiterate, and low income individuals from developing countries. This is the critical 
moral debate this work has also tried to show, and that underlines all the discussions about 
financial development aid in general. If it is true that Blockchain technologies aim at 
introducing more ownership and transparency in the way funds are administered towards 
developing countries, the next step that should be taken into consideration is enhancing 
capacity development and building trust among individuals that will be using these 
technologies. This means to develop programs that accompany the deployment of 
technologies along with the spread of technical capacities and basic knowledge for the 
population on how to manage and secure private assets and data through digital platforms249. 
Indeed, this is a clear difficulty for the private sector, which has to create more 
comprehensive and inclusive digital tools according to the particular contexts where they will 
be operating. But also for the public sector and NGOs, which will have to help by providing 
political, economic and social assistance and experience in the field in order to avoid this 
digital divide. However, this will take years because nowadays people in the development 
cooperation field are just starting to know and consider Blockchain technologies. 
Besides this cross-cutting concern, there are other issues that require the attention of the 
international community. They are the following250: 
a) Building the adequate infrastructures in developing countries. It is already known 
that one of the main limitations preventing MFIs from pursuing its goal was the lack 
of infrastructures through which to secure and streamline the delivery of financial 
development aid. If this is to be overcome, there are different types of infrastructures 
that the public and the private sector must consider when implementing Blockchain 
technologies in developing countries. Indeed, since in many places there did not exist 
previous infrastructure nor competing industries alike, it is thought that the process 
will be easier. All of them are meant to help reducing operation and administrative 
costs, and by this achieving a more adequate, faster and efficient delivery of financial 
services. 
o Technical: this refers to all the telecommunications and electronic 
infrastructures needed to have broadband internet connection and thus assure 
a continued and fast access to platforms using Blockchain technologies. For 
example, a mobile network. 
o Environmental: related to the previous, this refers to having enough energy 
resources to support the expected level of energy consumption depending on 





248 World Economic Forum and PwC, 2020, op cit., note 156. 
249 Zambrano, R., 2017., op. cit., note 175, p. 23. 
250Zwitter, A., Boisse-Despiaux, M., 2018, op. cit., note 207, pp. 5-6; Cuellar Benavides, J., 2018. op. cit., note 
75, p. 35; Zambrano, R., 2017., op. cit., note 175, p. 23; UNDP, n.d., note 243; ZOS Lending Network, 2019. 
Decentralized Finance in Developing Countries: Its Potential and Constraints. [Blog]. Medium, Available at: 
https://medium.com/the-capital/decentralized-finance-in-developing-countries-its-potential-and-constraints- 
5e5fc8fb8651 [last accessed on 30 March 2021] 
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b) Adopting new international and national regulatory mechanisms. In the 2018 World 
investment Forum session about “Blockchain for Sustainable Development” it was 
stated the convenience to create a legislative framework to ensure that Blockchain 
technologies were used to achieve major social goals. By acknowledging everything 
said in this work, it is thought that the first main steps that should be taken in this 
regard are three. 
o International legal frameworks: Internationally-agreed standards and 
principles should harmonise and guide countries when approaching and 
implementing Blockchain technologies at the international and national level, 
and especially in the fields of development cooperation and humanitarian aid. 
Those frameworks should be the result of private sector needs balanced with 
public sector collective objectives and interests. In this regard, frameworks 
should be aligned with international public law, humanitarian law and human 
rights law, and also address questions preventing the abuse for private sector 
gain, like the use of taxations. 
o Data and privacy protection policies: Ambitious regulatory policies and 
processes need to be embraced in developing countries to secure information 
and individuals’ privacy, and with this avoid great disparities between 
countries. 
o Transparency and anti-corruption measures: One of the biggest problems 
identified in the failures of ODA and national financial institutions when 
delivering aid was the embedded corruption and lack of transparency that 
many developing countries face and which ultimately prevent efficacy and 
efficiency results. To avoid it, developing countries should also introduce 
transparency and anti-corruption policies following the benefits that 
Blockchain technologies can already bring in this regard. 
 
c) Deciding which type of institutional governance is the most appropriate. The 
introduction of Blockchain technologies by the private sector and the multiple gains 
they offer in relation to new forms of decentralised governance forces the 
international community and especially the public sector to make a step beyond and 
decide which kind of public global institutional arrangements are the most 
appropriate for this context. Those decisions will then be easily reproduced at the 
national level. The key demands that have been raised are two. 
o Inclusive policies: Another important cause of the failures of development 
cooperation aid is the lack of ownership policies have when they are being 
drafted. For a long time, people in the field have been prevented to participate 
in decision-making process directly affecting themselves, and thus the results 
have ended up worsening their situations. The use of Blockchain technologies 
offer a fantastic opportunity to transform this situation, facilitating in such a 
way the transformation towards a more bottom-up approach. Consequently, 
by enabling individuals and developing countries to become more 
empowered, they would be more capable and proactive to create favourable 
policies, to implement pilot projects and prototypes, and to allow more talent 
and expertise to grow. 
o Multi-stakeholderism: In this particular context there is no single actor 
holding unanimously the power, the resources and the capacity to deal with 
how Blockchain technologies are being implemented and regulated. This 
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discussion can be traced back to the different types of authority explained 
before, and puts the international community in a progressively more common 
scenario in which the global governance is shifting towards multi-stakeholder 
models. Since the private sector and the civil society are protagonist actors in 
the emergence, deployment and well-functioning of Blockchain technologies, 
the public sector cannot go in any other direction. Instead, the public sector 
will have to accept this reality and find a way to adapt to it while preserving 
its essential and basic role as guarantee of rights and public goods. 
 
 
3.6 The horizon of future financial development aid: the multi-stakeholder 
approach 
 
Throughout this work it has been presented the urgency to transform the way in which 
development aid, and particularly financial development aid, has been thought, decided and 
implemented worldwide. By pointing to its deficiencies the criticisms have warned about the 
perils and consequences of avoiding the participation of the society as a whole in a matter 
which, in turn, affects us all. In this regard, the UN SDG nº 17 highlights the need to establish 
global partnerships for sustainable development as the only possible international strategy to 
achieve more progress without leaving no one behind. The proposal of Blockchain 
technologies in the field of financial development cooperation is a feasible way of facilitating 
those partnerships beyond the public level. However, in order to assure the disruptive 
potential can be deployed, it is mandatory to firstly consider which are the most effective 
ways for achieving so. And this debate is automatically materialized in the UN Blockchain 
Commission for Sustainable Development251, already created in 2017 and aimed at 
developing a multi-sectoral framework when utilizing blockchain to implement solutions 
against global challenges. The Commission maintains a multi-stakeholder participation, with 
the presence of the UN, member states, international organizations, private entities and civil 
society. Indeed, afterwards it has launched “Blockchain for Impact” (BFI), a collaborative 
advocacy and action platform designed to serve the growing community with leaderships 
from the global blockchain ecosystem. Therefore, the multi-stakeholder approach seems to 
be the most appropriate form of governance in this emerging field too, and will only be 
strengthened in the upcoming future. An important transformation in the history of financial 












251 II SDG, 2018. Commission White Paper Explores Blockchain Use for SDGs || News. [online]. SDG 
Knowledge Hub. Available at: https://sdg.iisd.org/news/white-paper-explores-blockchain-use-for-sdgs/ [last 
accessed on 15 March 2021] 
252 United Nations, 2021. op. cit., note 214. 
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The intention of this work has been to introduce a new theoretical and practical proposal to 
secure and streamline the delivery of financial development aid using emergent Blockchain 
technologies through digital platforms, in the context of on-going international discussions 
about how to improve the efficacy and efficiency of the field. For it, it has offered a brief 
historical evolution about financial development aid, mainly focused on microfinance, and 
afterwards it has tried to compare how can Blockchain technologies correct and improve the 
limitations identified, by offering its major potentialities to achieve the UN SDGs and other 
specific goals related to financial development aid. The reason for doing so have been to 
present the extent to which Blockchain technologies can impact in the field, providing as 
examples a selection of good practices coming both from the private sector and from the UN. 
Those have not been chosen randomly, but rather to proof that the future governance of 
financial development aid will only achieve its effectiveness if it fulfills to introduce a 
bottom-up approach that takes into consideration and leverages the needs and the capacities 
of all the relevant actors: public entities, private companies, academia, NGOs and the civil 
society. 
Concretely, the work has first tried to present a synthesis about the main conceptual debates 
regarding development aid, pointing to the present shift of paradigm, from the liberal practice 
to the postcolonial critique, as well as the unanimous support to engage in multi-stakeholder 
global partnerships to achieve the settled commitments. In this regard, the work has 
highlighted that the liberal development view through interventionist theories has prevailed 
as the dominant in the international community especially after the Cold War. Development 
has been sought alongside capitalism, as a practice that needs to be related to it rather than a 
transformative process. Consequently, in many parts of the world the development action has 
maintained a very limited view, focusing basically on targeted practices, including in foreign 
aid. This has constrained or even impede the possibility of using the development aid in larger 
and strategic long-term projects aimed at rebuilding the economic and social structures of 
underdeveloped societies. This liberal view has been traditionally exercised by States – and 
specially by OECD DAC members, until post World War II in which the international 
community sees a proliferation of different types of actors: development agencies, NGOs and 
large private corporations and philanthropic donors. Though this diversification is aimed at 
bringing more financial resources to growing challenges, the truth is that efficacy and 
efficiency is in most of the cases limited because there are important misalignments between 
development agents and receiving populations. This persisting critique is at the core of the 
four High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness celebrated in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), 
Accra (2008) and Busan (2011), which served to stress that the lack of coherence and 
effectivity of aid development policies was coming, precisely, because spill-over effects were 
not taken into consideration and because practices focused on alleviating poverty were not 
resulting in sustainable progress. 
In this scenario amid the global economic crisis after 2008 the international community was 
forced to shift into global development paradigms which take into consideration people- 
centred approaches and localization practices when configuring development policies. This 
coincided in time with the approval of UN Sustainable Development Goals in 2015. In this 
new global development approach paradigm, the governance of development aid should be 
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in the form of multi-stakeholder global partnerships, as was effectively decided with the 
approval and functioning of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation 
in 2016, endorsed by 161 countries, multilateral institutions like the UNDP and the OECD, 
bilateral donor agencies, private sector companies, civil society organizations, and other 
relevant networks and stakeholders at the regional and local level. 
The present theoretical conceptualizations of development aid have served the work to 
particularly address the functioning of international financial development aid, which 
consists in voluntary monetary flows given from one donor to a receiver with the aim of 
supporting and assisting in its economic, social and political development. It seeks to 
alleviate systematic challenges, such as poverty and the improvement of living standards, 
and thus it maintains a long-term vision. 
Nowadays the main source of financing for development aid in Least Development Countries 
is still the Official Development Assistance, delivered by OECD DAC members to a concrete 
list of ODA recipients (which accounts for bilateral aid) or to international development 
institutions (which accounts for multilateral aid), in the form of grants or loans. However, 
this aid has been vastly criticized because it has been reduced over time and has maintained 
in many cases an earmarked condition, losing efficacy and effectiveness. This is particularly 
alarming considering the recent challenges with the pandemic of COVID-19 to meet UN 
SDGs by 2030. Because of this, in the 2020 Financing for Sustainable Development Report 
the UN points out the need to put more efforts in increasing and improving access to ODA. 
But also, to mobilize additional financial resources coming from South-South cooperation, 
Development Financial Institutions (DFIs) and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), 
and other actors from the private sector (NGOs, philanthropists, private social investments) 
which are becoming more and more important in the international financial development 
system. All those actors are shaping the political governance of financial development aid, 
as the alternative proposal of this work has tried to show. 
Afterwards, the work has gone deeper into the evolution of microfinance as a complementary 
approach to development, assessing its real impact as an anti-poverty tool. It has explained 
from the origins of Microfinance with the Grameen Bank Model of Muhammad Yunnus in 
1976 in Bangladesh to the commercialization of Microfinance in the 1990s decade 
throughout the world. In this sense, microfinance was developed thinking that giving small 
amounts of money to poor entrepreneurs and small businesses will be the most efficient 
policy to combat poverty and improve the standards of living of the communities, which have 
been traditionally excluded from banks and financial institutions. But loans were provided 
with high interests and costs associated, which people could not afford to pay. However, the 
Microfinance model gained large-scale outreach profitability and became attracting by 
international development agencies like the UNDP and US right win foundations. It grew 
and developed as an industry during the 1990s and consolidated as a commercial sector in 
the 2000s. But critiques emerged in the first place arguing the failure to alleviate poverty and 
generate progress were indeed strengthened during those years and especially when the 
global economic crises started. Not only the ultimate objective of the policy was challenged, 
but also the fact the fundamental idea for which the contemporary microcredit model was no 
longer a bottom-up redistributive mechanism challenging the political and economic system, 
but rather it was just legitimizing and perpetuating it. 
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The rapid historical review serves the work to shed light upon those hard critics, by arguing 
that the problem of the mechanism derived from the way it was thought and implemented 
towards developing countries, and thus the solution required a better orientation and 
management according to the particular contexts. As well, that financial strategies in 
development aid were a continuum of policies that needed to be aligned and harmonized to 
achieve the desirable objectives. Meaning by this that whilst micro-financial development 
aid is assessed in this work as a complementary approach progressively becoming more 
important in the global ecosystem, in order for it to be successful public interventions had 
also to address the given market failures at the same time. 
This better orientation and management is precisely the proposal of this work, which speaks 
about the technological boom and the infinite new business opportunities that began to 
emerge in the late 2000s. In this regard, the work focuses on the leading role Fintech 
companies are having when using technologies to offer better financial services to those in 
need, specifically with the positive impact digital platforms can have when accessing more 
finance for local development and also bringing efficiency delivery gains. The digitalization 
of financial development aid has been accepted by the international community at the UN 
level, citing for example the UNDP and the UNCDF, but also traditional MicroFinance 
institutions and mainstream banks are engaged in the idea of facilitating the financial 
inclusion and financial payments through the development of digital ecosystems in 
developing countries. 
The chosen examples are the peer-to-peer digital platforms, which emerge as a response of 
mistrust in traditional international and local economic and political institutions, for the way 
they have been operating in developing countries. The way to do so is by directly 
empowering the citizens, by acknowledging that aid effectiveness and progress is only 
achieved when it is based in solidarity redistribution. Each individual has the potential to 
help many others, and in general the potential to change the world. Those alternative models 
represent a radical new way of securing and streamlining the delivery of financial 
development aid because they have in their core the willingness that individuals have to see 
real changes in the world. To secure because intermediaries are reduced and in most cases 
money is lent directly to borrowers, with which lenders can establish a close relationship. 
And to streamline because every day more lenders and borrowers are joining those platforms, 
and thus more transformative projects can be funded. Moreover, they enhance and induce a 
broader change in the way aid has been delivered traditionally, meaning with the following. 
Firstly, that North-South cooperation is no longer seen from a paternalistic unconcerned point 
of view, but rather from a solidarity cooperative point of view. Individuals from both sides 
get to know each other, get to share the preoccupation for the business to succeed, and after 
all the wish to achieve more progress. And secondly, that lenders can be from any part of the 
world, even from the same country, thus it also contributes to enhance South-South 
cooperation and to reduce inequalities within countries. 
To understand the present importance of peer-to-peer platforms for financial development 
aid, the work starts by describing the first examples of Zidisha as a micro-lending community 
and Kiva as a non-profit crow-lending platform. Then it addresses the need to incorporate 
more technologies in the field which could help to significantly contribute in meeting UN 
SDGs by 2030, in a critical context in which socioeconomic challenges have worsen due to 
the pandemic of COVID-19. The perfect introduction to speak about the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution and the transformative changes enabled by different key digital technologies. 
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Concretely, about the disruptive potential that Blockchain technologies can have as a 
corrective mechanism to enhance microfinance and in general to secure and streamline the 
delivery of financial development aid. 
Throughout the last chapter the work has assessed the capacity of Blockchain technologies 
to effectively tackle human development challenges in a better way than other previous 
mechanisms, by comparing the alternatives it can offer to MicroFinance multiple limitations. 
It has indeed highlighted three main aspects. The first, that it can bring more transparency to 
systems and platforms, transforming the way in which funds are monitored and managed. 
The second, that it allows a more decentralized and sustainable management of the resources, 
favoring aid efficiency and financial inclusivity. The third, that it enables the creation of, and 
access to new financial mechanisms. This is indeed related to increase and improve the 
accessibility to microfinance options, as Blockchain can truly deliver on the promise of 
democratizing investment and access to financial services and information, as well as on the 
wealth creation and redistribution process across the world. 
The work has supported those affirmations with some current Blockchain microfinancing 
applications either coming from the private companies and aid agencies, which maintain the 
leading voice, and from the UN agencies, which are still in an experimental stage. Describing 
the state of the art allows the work to end up putting into the table the current limitations 
experimented worldwide or by developing countries in particular, which ultimately prevent 
the whole implementation of Blockchain technologies. In order to avoid reproducing 
situations of inequality and power asymmetries, the main actors in the system should focus 
on capacity development and building trust among individuals who will be using the 
technologies. Besides that, other issues must be addressed like building adequate 
infrastructures in developing countries, adopting new international and national regulatory 
mechanisms, and deciding which type of institutional governance is the most appropriate for 
the matter. The latter offers the possibility to reaffirm the same words expressed at the 
beginning of the work, which are the two key conceptual and practical elements to 
incorporate in the upcoming decision-making process of financial development aid. The first, 
inclusive development policies preserving a bottom-up approach. The second, the multi- 
stakeholder governance between the relevant actors (UN, member states, international 
organizations, private entities and civil society) needed to assure the disruptive potential of 
Blockchain technologies can be deployed. Important transformations in the history of 
financial development aid that have come to stay. 
In this regard, the work has proven the main hypothesis, being this that Blockchain 
technologies through the use of digital platforms can clearly help in improving the delivery 
of financial development aid, by making it more secure and streamlined. The proposal has 
not only been theoretical, but it has also been successful in describing the current applications 
that are being implemented, showing clear disparities between the public and the private 
sector. Whilst the private sector is the leading actor in terms of innovation, the public sector 
is starting to acknowledge about the importance of introducing Blockchain technologies in 
the field of financial development aid and many others. In this work it has been selected the 
view of the UN due to its international and general character, but it has been useful to prove 
the tendency of convergence between both types of actors in what regards the role 
technologies will play in the governance of financial development aid. The selection of this 
field has responded to its essential role in achieving the UN SDGs by 2030. Moreover, the 
work has also brought a critical side, by highlighting the main limitations experienced both 
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in developed and developing countries that ultimately act as an impediment for the full 
deployment of those technologies. Because of this, the work can conclude that the application 
of Blockchain technologies in the financial development field is still in an initial phase, and 




















































253 See Annex 1. 
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Annex 1: Interview with Miguel Caballero 
 
Miguel Caballero is an industrial engineer from Barcelona, and one of the most recognised 
Spanish experts on Blockchain technology and assets tokenization. He is the co-author of the 
Masters in Blockchain taught at Tutellus, the biggest educative platform of the Hispanic 
world. He also teaches in IE Business School, Esade Business School, La Salle, and others. 
He is the author of the book “Bitcoin, Blockchain y Tokenización para inquietos” (2019), 
which has been used throughout this work to get a general picture of the technical aspects 
about Blockchain. However, the most ambitious part of this work is the last one, in which it 
is analysed if the BT can really be a disruptive tool to secure and streamline the delivery of 
financial development aid and help to meet the UN SDGs. In this sense, Miguel Caballero 
was contacted to arrange an interview in which to ask about his opinion regarding this last 
matter. Here is the transcript. 
1. How would you define BT in this scenario of global challenges? 
 
When we refer to Blockchain technology we need to concrete it, and for this I propose to use 
the appellative “public” or to directly speak about “cryptoeconomy and tokenization”. 
a. What differences can we find since its emergence? Is it booming? Which are the 
perspectives in the short-mid run (2-5 years)? 
 
In this sense, the Blockchain has evolved a lot and in many spheres. More presence in the 
market, in terms of the people accepting it, the number of users, the type and diversification 
of new technology, the own ecosystem…The current reality has nothing to do with the 
beginnings of Blockchain and Bitcoin in 2009, neither with the context of 2015. In the short 
and mid run the expectations are to be exponential. The amount of money entering the crypto 
market is tremendous, and I do not believe this would stop nor deaccelerate. We are now in 
a context in which the interest rates are negative, this means the value of money is decreasing. 
To this we need to add the fact that central banks are operating by themselves in the emission 
of more money. In consequence, every time there will be more people investing money in 
the crypto world, and for this the expectations of growth are exponential. 
b. In general, which are the main positive and negative traits the BT can bring to 
society? 
 
In public Blockchains the positive aspects regard the freedom of every individual to choose 
what to do with its money, and the independence from a third-authority. The negative aspects 
appeal to the great responsibility every individual has to control its own money. If you lose 
the keys of your electronic wallet you lose your money. There is a risk in there that people 
need to be prepared for. Unfortunately, not everyone is ready for it. 
 
2. The BT emerges and proliferates from and within the private sector. Progressively we are 
seeing how the public sector gets more interested in the disruptive potential the BT can 
have in many fields, producing more efficacy and efficiency. Many other traditional 
financial institutions and microfinance institutions are doing the same. 
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a. Why do you think those actors are interested in incorporating this technology? 
b. Which are the main limitations that exist in the public and financial sector for the 
BT to grow and expand? Are these limitations shared throughout the world or are 
there clear differences between developed and developing countries? 
 
I believe that the limitations experienced in developing countries is that most of the people 
are unbanked. But banks are never going to reach these people because they cannot obtain 
profit from it. However, there is no need to do that to enter the crypto world. Users only need 
a mobile phone, which most of the people in the world have. 
In this respect, banks will need to accept this reality, and I believe they will end up purchasing 
enterprises or microfinancing applications or start-ups having crypto products, because their 
infrastructures are too much bigger for reaching this targeted people. 
On the one side, unfortunately developing countries are never a priority for large 
corporations. There is a lack of strategic interest. These corporations and the governments in 
general maintain a kind of reticence for the crypto world, and a such have a negative 
perspective towards it. They want to prohibit it, to regulate it, by emphasizing its high 
volatility. But they do not take into consideration the positive aspects, what can blockchain 
bring to society. Having this in mind, I think many years or even decades still remain before 
those actors change its perspective, from seeing the crypto world as a threat to an opportunity 
for helping a lot of people in developing countries. 
From a public global governance point of view, it is really difficult to find “cryptofriendly” 
countries with a favorable regulation. At the global level we need to take into consideration 
the excessive power the United States along with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission254 (SEC) have in the matter. Everything that those both actors say sees no 
contradiction from other countries. Thus, limitations are more or less shared throughout the 
world. In Europe there are places like Portugal and Estonia that tend to favor crypto 
businesses. But in developing countries there is nothing we can do now, we will need to wait 
many years until they implement a crypto-friendly regulation. 
 
 
3. The financial development aid is a field in which the UN is trying to explore the potential 
that the BT could introduce. At this point the organization is just starting, and we can 
already find some local-based projects in collaboration with the private sector. 
 
a. In your opinion, how could BT help in improving the financial development aid and 
humanitarian aid? Which are the opportunities BT can provide to boost its efficacy, 
efficiency and security? To what extent can it be disruptive? 
 
From the perspective of collaborative microfinancing applications, I believe that Blockchain 
could really make a difference. It is very opportunistic since nothing has been done in this 
direction. Platforms that can collect money from developed countries and send it to 
developing countries with competitive interest rates can be highly beneficial for them. 
Precisely, their problem lies in extremely high interest rates for accessing loans, ranging from 
 
254 US. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2021. Supporting small business, [online] SEC. Available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/ [last accessed on 30 March]. 
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50%-100% annually, something in Europe is totally prohibited. In fact, interest rates above 
25% are considered a crime. Thus, when those digital platforms offer interest rates of 12- 
13%, people in developing countries perceive it as nearly zero. Therefore, I believe that the 
introduction of blockchain and cryptocurrencies to those platforms would definitively help 
those countries to develop. But always thinking from the microfinancing perspective, 
following the example of Bangladesh or Ethic Hub. 
b. Which are the main shortcomings developing countries could encounter when 
introducing BT in financial development aid? Could we consider that the main 
factors limiting the expansion of BT are the differences in every country’s capacities? 
Which could be the first actions policymakers should take to correct this situation? 
 
Since we are in an initial moment, there are many different limitations. For example, we do 
not find enterprises offering this type of services. The risk of default is always obvious in this 
field, but if you have high interest rates you are compensating on the other side if this 
happens. Then, I believe that what is needed is: more enterprises, a wide distribution of 
resources, better communication and more time. Finally, it is fundamental to develop 
technological products and services that are easy for people in developing countries to 
understand and use. Indeed, users in developing countries do not need to worry about 
understanding how Blockchain works, but rather to know they can access a microloan to 
develop its own microbusiness. 
 
4. To what extent the BT could help to meet the UN SDGs? 
 
I think Blockchain can really contribute in meeting the UN SDGs. Indeed, many people claim 
Bitcoin, Blockchain and the cryptocurrencies are highly energy consuming and thus can be 
a clear pitfall for the environment and a huge limitation for the sustainable development. 
However, this argument is totally false, as this graphic shows the incredible difference in 
energy consuming that Bitcoin currently represents in comparison to the mining of gold and 
the banking system. 
Besides that, I believe that Blockchain can help in the good direction because in the end it is 
aid, it is a form of economic and financial development and it is clearly aligned with the UN 
SDGs. 
 
5. From a public governance perspective, which role should the relevant stakeholders 
at the international level – public, private sector, the academia and the civil society 
– play in the present and future management of this technology? 
 
The role of the public sector should be to avoid prohibiting and excessively regulation, 
instead to let the market grow and progress without external forces. There is enough money, 
the problem is sometimes the public sector does not allow enterprises do their job. 
The role of the private sector should be of spreading the knowledge to more users, and in this 
scenario the public sector could help by providing assistance to those enterprises. Specially, 
what lacks in all the world but with more intensity in developing countries is financial 
education, and this is fundamental. 
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I do not really defend this type of governance in which the public and the private sector work 
together because they are incompatible. I do not believe the public sector could really help if 
it is positioned as the leader. Instead, it should let the private sector do whatever it is 
necessary. 
Table 9: Comparing energy expenditure across monetary and banking 
systems (2018) 
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